

JAPAN—WHITHER?



Townsend Harris

See pages 35, 102

Japan-Whither?

A Discussion of Japanese Problems

by

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
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THE AGES," ETC.

With an Introduction by

PRINCE TOKUGAWA

REVISED EDITION



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
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TO



PREFACE

THIS book is composed on a somewhat novel plan. Almost every chapter opens with a statement made to the author by some prominent Japanese, beginning with General Araki. The Japanese point of view is then brought out, and sometimes criticized. Incidentally, the American view-point also is often set forth. The book does not pretend to offer a solution of the problems discussed, but does attempt to state them concisely and to clear away some of the confusion with which they are all too often surrounded. It has but one object: to make a modest contribution to the better understanding of Japan's problems by the Americans, and of the American point of view by the Japanese. The writer is an American who has been a staunch friend of Japan for more than forty years.

As the plan of the book demands a variety of opinions from authoritative sources, the citations are numerous.

PREFACE

I wish to thank the many friends whose kindness makes this book possible, and especially Prince Tokugawa for the Introduction.

Tokyo, March, 1935.

James A. B. Scherer.

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INTRODUCTION

I AM glad to hear that Dr. James A. B. Scherer, the eminent authority on Far Eastern affairs and author of several books on the same subject, has prepared a new work containing interesting and instructive observations which he has gathered in the course of his recent tour through China and Manchuria.

I am convinced that it is most opportune for Japan to listen to candid words from a judicious friend at this important juncture. At the same time no person who feels real interest in the preservation of peace in the Western Pacific can afford to miss the rare opportunity which the forthcoming volume by a competent and well informed writer will afford him of gaining an insight into the real life and aspirations of the Japanese people.

Tokugawa Iyemasa

I

JAPAN'S CRISIS

“What else could we do for our own defense and self-preservation?”

THE speaker was General Araki, then Minister of War and head of Japan's great army. He alluded, of course, to the military operations in Manchuria. His question was really a confession; a confession of his conviction that Japan was waging a life-and-death struggle. Similar confessions have been made to me by other thoughtful leaders. One of these leaders, an international figure of the highest renown, went so far as to say that his country is facing the gravest crisis in all her long history. Such statements have naturally commanded my attention, so that I have tried to formulate the factors in the present crisis, with the following result.

1. MILITARY OPERATIONS

These became active on September 18, 1931. Whether seizing Mukden or subduing Manchurian bandits, shelling Shanghai or

taking possession of Shanhaikwan, Japan's army had little rest. Military operations are always dangerous. Apart from the destruction of life and property, they involve the loss of enormous sums of money and of the really priceless "imponderable" of international good will. In addition, they tend to put militarism in the saddle, give it the reins of power, stir passion, and indefinitely postpone that reign of peace which is the supreme hope of mankind.

I am not saying that war is never necessary, or that it is always unrighteous. I am by no means a pacifist. I am simply saying that war, or the similitude of war, is always dangerous, and that this danger must be named among the six factors of the crisis through which Japan is still passing.

2. FINANCE

"The Articles of Sun-tzu," written by a Chinese warrior of the fifth century B. C., is the title of a compressed little book that is still the military classic of the Far East. It is valued even more highly in Japan than in China. In his Article on the Operations of War, Sun-tzu says that even if military operations are successful, "let the operations

long continue, and the soldiers' ardor decreases, the weapons become worn, and . . . strength disappears. Again, if the war last long, the country's means do not suffice. Then, when the soldiers are worn out, weapons blunted, strength gone and funds spent, neighboring princes arise and attack that weakened country. . . . There has never been a country which has benefited from a prolonged war. . . . The cost of supplying the army in distant fields is the chief drain on the resources of a state: if the war be distant the citizens are impoverished."

Japan, believing that she was fighting for self-preservation, appropriated in the 1933 budget the huge sum of 820,000,000 yen for military operations. Out of a total budget of 2,237,960,000 yen, this enormous single appropriation was certainly an interesting commentary on *Suntzu*.

3. ISOLATION

For the first time since the Restoration Japan finds herself practically isolated from the sympathies and admiration of her sister nations. It is an unaccustomed rôle. Her *Genrō*, one of the wisest groups of counselors that ever charted the course of a ship

of state, made the good will of the rest of the world a major objective. This good will has been an asset of incalculable advantage to Japan. I am not explaining how it has been lost, I am simply asserting its loss. I am not saying that it cannot be regained, I am only pointing out its value. Whoever has the patience to read this book through will discern my deep sympathies with Japan, and my conviction that she is the victim of much misunderstanding and injustice. But at the moment I am trying to name the elements of the critical situation in which she finds herself, without apportioning the blame, and it seems clear that isolation must be reckoned in.

4. CHINESE ANARCHY

George Sokolsky, who knows his China as well as any living man, says that "the Chinese is, before all else, an anarch, a resister to discipline. He joins a group with a mental reservation. He pledges allegiance with his tongue in his cheek." The reason the Manchus ruled China from 1644 to 1911 was that they let it alone; having learned from a study of Chinese history that when an emperor interfered with the people and

especially when he overtaxed them they arose and overthrew him, and then went back to their work unconcerned as to who sat on the Dragon Throne so long as he let them alone. Sun Yat Sen led the revolt against the Manchus because their old Empress Dowager meddled too much with his people. No sooner had the Russian Revolution succeeded than he cabled his congratulations to Lenin, and shortly afterwards struck hands with Karakhan and Borodin. The latter, whom he brought down to Canton, has wielded great power throughout China. What wonder that today her map is studded with red armies? Besides, Canton is in revolt against the Kuomintang of Nanking, the factional bitterness being so strong that Nanking failed to come to the aid of the 19th Route Cantonese army at Shanghai. Madame Sun later attacked Nanking and called for "the smashing of the White Terror that has filled a million graves, and filled the country's prisons with thousands of our best men and women, boys and girls, whose only crime has been an attempt to shatter the chains that bind the Chinese masses."

The Chinese seem to have nationalism without patriotism: an intense nationalistic

pride, but an apparent inability to make the sacrifices necessary to sink selfish differences and build up a government. I have made five visits to China: in 1923, 1924, 1931, 1932-'3 and 1934. Anarchism has grown steadily. This is a menace to the entire world, but especially to Japan, both because of her propinquity and because of her trade relations.

5. COMMUNISM

An eloquent Japanese writer once boasted that his country had never been invaded. "The invasions that have succeeded," he said, "have been those of ideas, not of peoples." Communism is an idea, and it is meeting with considerable success. During 1932 6,900 alleged communists were arrested throughout Japan. Communism offers a specious appeal to youth. Its spread is aided by unwise attempts to suppress it. If there is any merit in that body of principles that have lain at the core of Japanese national character throughout history, then Communism in its Russian or Chinese form is supremely dangerous. It strikes at the family, ridicules loyalty, and in fact sneers at all spiritual values.

6. MATERIALISM

This can and does exist independently of Communism. In a sense it is the mother of Communism, which is in revolt against it. Materialism originated, so far as the modern world is concerned, in the Industrial Revolution. That movement is now so old and so well understood in Europe and America that a few of its attendant evils have been recognized and somewhat ameliorated. Japan had to face it abruptly, has not yet had time to adjust herself to it. Consequently its product, an overweening materialism, runs riot. This danger is perhaps the gravest of all that beset Japan, because it is so deeply rooted in human nature, so bedecked with the tinsel of "success," so hard to define, so insidious in the instillation of its poison, so lacking a concrete antidote.

If this is a true diagnosis, perhaps my wise friend was right when he confessed his fear that Japan is passing through the gravest crisis in her history. Even if he be only partially right, a condition exists which summons the Japanese spirit to its utmost endeavor. The will finds the way.

II

MANCHURIA

"Yes, I think we went too far."

THIS was a second scholar, younger but scarcely less famous than the other. We were discussing Manchuria. While stressing the importance of Japan's free accessibility to the raw materials that are hers by right and that seem essential to her very existence, he seemed inclined to think that this could have been guaranteed without assuming a virtual protectorate over Manchuria — *if* the powers that be had not pushed Japan to extremes. Much may be said in support of this view. Certainly the Japanese moderates were embarrassed in the early stages of the imbroglio by some of the activities of the League, always well intended but not always wise. What body of men can always be wise? We know what happened. Japan made possible the setting up of the new state "Manchoukuo" and then stole a march on the Lytton Commission by recognizing it before they could render judgment. When their report was finally published she dis-

sected it mercilessly. Having early announced that Jehol was to be deemed an integral part of the territory, she took advantage of the Shanhaikwan affair to make good her announcement. She declared unequivocally that she intended to stay outside the Great Wall, although aggressive tactics by Chinese troops compelled a temporary seizure of Peking; and she kept her word.

Now that a Japanese protectorate over Manchuria is virtually an accomplished fact, a little history ought to be recalled. The southern tongue of this great territory, known as the Liaotung Peninsula, was ceded to Japan by China as a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-'5. Japan was immediately raped of this booty by three Western powers, led by Russia, pretending to be concerned for the integrity of China. Shortly afterward Russia, with absolute cynicism, appropriated the tip of this Peninsula to herself.

As a young foreigner then teaching in Japan I can well remember my own indignation. If my feelings were outraged, what of young Sadao Araki? Sensitive, totally unselfish and intensely patriotic, the rape of the Peninsula impressed him profoundly. Schooling himself in the creed that "the

sword is the soul of the samurai," he graduated from the Military College in 1898 when just twenty-one. Needless to say, he fought in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-'5. How he must have rejoiced in Japan's victory, when she took back the tip of the tongue and also took over the South Manchuria Railway with valuable concessions adjacent to its line! Stationed in Russia at the outbreak of the European War, he returned to Japan with a firm faith that the Allies must win, and had much to do with Japan's decision to throw in her lot with them.

There can be no doubt that Japan was harassed by Chinese soldiers in protecting her Manchurian property times almost unnumbered before she finally struck. When she did strike, the powers faced a dilemma. They could take the view either that Japan was exercising her police rights in protecting her lawful property, or that she had violated the Kellogg Pact. There was every whit as much to be said for the first view as for the second, perhaps more. Had they adopted it, the matter might have been adjudicated without extensive military operations. Unfortunately, they chose the other course. Japan was scolded like a bad boy, and, rankling

with a sense of injustice, undertook to fight a lone hand.

Perhaps that is what my friend meant when he said: "Yes, I think we went too far; but we were pushed!"

Now that Manchoukuo has been set up, it ought to be given a fair chance. Pu' Yi, in spite of the ridicule that has been poured upon him, is by no means a puppet; and if the Japanese know their own interests they will do everything possible to remove the stigma of "a puppet state" from the land of his fathers. The chief reason there are 30,000,000 or so Chinese in Manchuria today is that the comparative law and order which the Japanese established there long ago offered the Chinese a refuge from the brigandage of their war-lords. For several years they poured up and in at the rate of a million a year, and that is why Manchoukuo is now "unalterably Chinese." Even the Lytton Report opposed a return to the *status quo ante*. Let the mainland of Eastern Asia, then, boast at least one orderly government, to stand as a bulwark against encroachments from Russia on the north, and as an example to anarchistic China in the south. If administered wisely as an object-lesson, Manchoukuo may

conceivably save China from the Communism that now so gravely threatens it.

Japan is no angel, but she is the sole representative in her part of the world of those ideals of orderly government that the West puts its faith in. Whether she has been thrust into her present domination of Manchuria partly by forces not within her control, or whether her anxieties and even her ambitions have propelled her, she is there, and she is building up a well-ordered state where brigands have long held sway. There is an ancient Chinese proverb, "Manchuria produces two crops : soya beans and bandits." In September, 1931, there were 300,000 bandits operating there. Now there are fewer than 50,000. Japan, with only 30,000 soldiers, produced this result by first capturing the bandits and then disarming them, sometimes even buying their weapons. She must by all means keep out of China proper, and she must work whole-heartedly for Manchoukuo's real independence. This being the case, the world will be better off—if a general war is avoided.

During an afternoon spent with General Araki I asked him for a message to the American people, and this is what he gave me :

With the serious menace of Russian Bolshevism and Chinese anarchism staring us in the face from the continent, with their agents vigorously active for the purpose of subverting the foundation of our national Constitution and destroying the traditions and welfare of our people, our main policy has been one of defense and self-preservation. The true meaning of our actions in Manchuria could be grasped only when the subject is viewed from this angle.

The Imperial Japanese Army is not the instrument of aggressive warfare, not the tool of conquest, not the instrument of systematic murder. It exists to be the bulwark of humanity, justice, and all those ideals which cater to the eternal well-being of mankind. We have firm faith in this mission of our defense institutions, and it is this faith which makes the Japanese soldiers march on the battle-fields and face certain death with perfect equanimity of mind. They die for the country and glory in the idea of it. They are reared in this faith and the people look upon them in the light of it.

Among our civilized neighbors, we regard the people of America as those on whom we can depend for friendship and co-operation for the cause of peace. We embrace the high ideals that inspired General Washington in times of old. The inspirations that urged President Roosevelt to use his great influence in stopping the blood-shed of the Russo-Japanese War are the very ones that

stir the blood of the Japanese race. We never forget the friendship which he showed us in the moments of our national crisis, though we scorn the idea that his mediation saved Japan from defeat. It was the broad cause of humanity that he served by his noble deeds on that occasion. Had it not been for his good offices, a few hundred thousand more of lives must have perished on the Manchurian fields and a few more billions wasted to increase the burdens on the taxpayers. President Roosevelt lives eternally in the memory of the Japanese people. Blessed be the name of Roosevelt!

Through your good self I wish to extend the hand of friendship to the people of America, and I trust it will be cordially accepted. We desire the friendship of the American people. If they but take trouble to study the position between our two countries, they will be convinced that I am not using merely diplomatic language in saying this.

III

SHANGHAI

“The Shina-goro got us into it!”

IT sounded like such a flimsy explanation of the Shanghai tragedy that I found difficulty in restraining a smile. I had just landed in New York from a trip around the world, and the speaker was a distinguished Japanese. My Wife and I had gone on through Shanghai just ahead of the outbreak, and I cannot describe the distress we felt when the news dispatches overtook us on our journey, recording the bombing of Shanghai. “Can it be possible, after all, that Japan has designs on China, and is seeking control of the Yangtze?” That was the first perplexed question, and I cite it simply to show the effect made on staunch friends of Japan through forty years. “Has her militarism got out of hand, and is she sacrificing at a stroke the good will so patiently achieved?”

From February until May such questions rankled, the news dispatches all the way from Singapore to New York being exasper-

atingly meager, and when my Japanese friend met my eager demand for an explanation with the Shina-goro bogey, I felt rather hopeless. Now, after coming over to Japan again, visiting Shanghai, questioning dozens of well-informed men of many nationalities, and reading reams of reports, I have reached the conclusion that the confession made by my Japanese friend in New York was correct.

Shina-goro are, of course, Japanese rough-necks infesting Shanghai, as American rough-necks infest Chicago. Before considering them, however, it is well to remember that the Japanese residents of Shanghai number some 30,000, equaling all the other foreigners combined; that the Japanese colony had been menaced for weeks by the 19th Route Cantonese army, the best army in China, fully intrenched; and that a merciless boycott was ruining Japanese trade.

In old times Shanghai could not have imposed a boycott in swift retaliation for events in Manchuria, the transmission of news being too slow. Besides, the Chinese were not yet versed in the use of the boycott as an instrument of war. But in 1905 they used it with telling effect against the

United States in retaliation for an immigration measure. Six times between 1908 and 1927 they invoked it against Japan. Encouraged by the results, in 1927 they brought Britain to terms by it, this being their first important victory over a Western country since 1842. When Manchuria was occupied they promptly trained their new weapon on Japan, with terrific efficiency. In some places it was eighty per cent effective. The most violent methods were used, far exceeding in ferocity anything they had done before. Administered by the Kuomintang at Nanking, it centred in Shanghai, where the Japanese not only normally do an enormous trade, but where they have huge investments in commercial and industrial enterprises. They supply more than seventy per cent of the yarn for Chinese weaving mills, and these latter were so injured by the boycott that they petitioned Nanking for relief. They did not get it. Hordes of Chinese coolies were thrown out of work by the boycott, which they blamed on Japan. Idle and sullen, they roamed the streets. A Chinese newspaper printed an offensive item about the Japanese Emperor, and this the Japanese resented. Street brawls became

frequent, culminating in an attack on five Japanese priests, one of whom died. At this point the Shina-goro took matters definitely in hand, inflicting a bloody retaliation. Meanwhile, over yonder lay the 19th Route army, with its guns trained on the Japanese settlement. Japan's navy was represented at Shanghai, like the navies of other powers, since the anarchy throughout China is such that the mouth of the Yangtze is always a floating fort. Japan had no marines, only bluejackets. They were as brave as though they were trained soldiers, but they had never enjoyed the discipline of trained soldiers. The Shina-goro hobnobbed with them, inflamed them with tales of atrocities. Chinese soldiers in plain clothes were incessantly firing on them from the rear. Their Admiral did not like this. Finally the Shina-goro seem to have reached the Admiral. If they did not attempt to bully him, they at least appealed to his sense of duty. For the matter of that, so did the respectable Japanese residents of Shanghai. Was he not there to protect them? Could he not blast the 19th Route army out of its trenches? Was not authority lodged in his hands? Rough-necks can be very persuasive; witness

Al Capone. The Admiral knew that 30,000 Japanese were indeed menaced, and he probably thought that the 19th Route army was no more efficient than ordinary Chinese armies. A mere demonstration might disperse them. On January 28 the Municipal Council of the International Settlements declared a state of emergency, and diplomatic notes passed back and forth between the Chinese mayor and the Japanese consul. By authority of the Municipal Council, orders were issued stationing international troops, including the Japanese, at appropriate posts. At midnight the Japanese bluejackets marched to their assigned station, which, naturally, was favorable for the protection of their nationals, and consequently opposed to the 19th Route army. It seems that they were fired on during their march. At any rate, the patience of their Admiral was finally exhausted, and he let his bluejackets open fire on the 19th Route army. It put up an unexpected resistance. When it resorted to artillery fire from armored trains, the Admiral used bombing airplanes. This was exceedingly dangerous for the International Settlements and the foreign troops, but the Admiral deemed it necessary to use his

bombing airplanes on an even broader scale. In fact, he utterly demolished the densely populated Chinese suburb of Chapei, nest of snipers and stronghold of the anti-Japanese associations. But he probably saved his own people from massacre.

Japan should always be grateful to the international authorities of Shanghai for the patience and self-restraint they exercised under utmost danger. A world conflict might have been precipitated except for the calm courage and cool wisdom of the civil and military officials of international Shanghai.

At last Japan sent over another Admiral, talented as a diplomat. Then the army came along and "cleaned up the mess," after six weeks of difficult campaigning, for they not only encountered an almost impossible terrain, but they also had to avoid impinging on the international settlements.

When, in May, a truce was arranged, upwards of 600,000 Chinese had been rendered homeless, the trade of Shanghai had dropped to the vanishing point, more than 200,000 laborers were without work, and 900 factories and shops were shut down or ruined, this last item alone meaning a loss of 170,000,000 Chinese dollars. Japan, of

course, had been put to a huge expense. And yet nothing was really settled. On the contrary, China's bitterness was intensified and her troops were imbued with a new morale, while the rest of the world is still perplexed by the mazes of the Shanghai affair. Many friends that had sided with Japan's case in Manchuria have now become lukewarm, or cold.

It must be remembered that General Araki withdrew his army as soon as it had done its work. After the ammunition of the 19th Route army gave out, he had the Yangtze Valley at his mercy. That was Japan's supreme opportunity had she desired to penetrate China.

IV

HOW AMERICA FEELS

“We have only three neighbors. America is one. Please persuade your country to be a good neighbor to us, seeing that our other neighbors are two big bad boys!”

YOU may smile when you first read this confession, but as you think it over it seems less funny. I have thought about it so much that it is no longer funny at all, but almost pathetic. It is a whimsical confession of loneliness. It is almost a plea; a plea for a sympathy based on a better understanding. It was uttered by one of the proudest men in Japan; one of the ablest, altogether one of the greatest. He consciously threw it into a whimsical form, for he always knows what he is doing. But he meant it from the bottom of his heart.

Think of it! Japan's three neighbors: Russia, China, the United States. China and Russia have failed her; if America fails her, it will be one of the tragedies of history, for both peoples.

When I came out here forty years ago Japan had a pet name for America. England was England, France was France, but America was the "Dai On Jin," "the Great Friendly People". How is it now? I would gladly give the balance of my life to have the former feeling restored, and made permanent.

America sent Commodore Perry over here. His "four black ships of evil mien" proved to be the harbingers of Japan's new day. Townsend Harris, who followed him, has been eulogized by a British diplomat as the most sagacious representative ever sent by one country to another. (Harris's coming, by the way, was a sheer stroke of luck. A Tammany Hall man, a New York bachelor, he had been wandering around in this part of the world, asked a Democratic administration for the new post, and got it.) Broad-minded missionaries came, headed by that man without a country, the Dutch-American Verbeck. Joseph Hardy Neesima helped to forge the new friendship. Many of Japan's brightest youths now found a welcome in Rutgers and Amherst, Harvard and Yale, where such boys as Theodore Roosevelt learned to love them and through them to

love their country. So it was that Japan, with her talent for gratitude and her genius in courtesy, came to call America the "Dai On Jin."

All went well until and throughout the Russo-Japanese War. In consequence of this war the curve of American admiration reached its apex. But scarcely was the war ended when the curve began to drop. I think it is almost possible to name the exact moment. That moment occurred during the Portsmouth Conference, and those who wish to mark it have only to date the appearance of Ōkuma's bold statement that Japan "as a matter of necessity must become a great power on the Asiatic continent." By the time Korea was annexed panegyric had become criticism.

Meanwhile Japan's enthusiasm was also cooling off, due to racial discrimination centred in California. Mutual suspicion was increasingly engendered, leading to a tug-of-war over naval armaments checked only by the Washington Conference. The great earthquake of 1923 brought the two peoples together again in a hand-clasp of genuine affection almost immediately shattered by circumstances attending the immigration act

of 1924. Now there looms up again the old question of the Asiatic mainland.

One who is neither a Japanese nor an American, but British—Mr. Hugh Byas—deals with this question so sanely in *Contemporary Japan* that I have asked his permission and that of the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan to quote him.

The China question is with us still, and only blind optimism can imagine that it will cease to cause strain and friction. The confusion and weakness of China will continue for many years to come, and the eventual outcome is as unpredictable as are the questions which may arise from that condition. Japan's place in the world creates her special interest in China; it is an interest which she cannot abandon if she would. Her standard of living, her commerce, her strategical security, the security of her institutions, are all affected by her relations with China. While the American and the European are in China to earn their breakfast, so to speak, by selling a portion of their manufactures, the Japanese is there on a matter of life and death. Japan cannot change the factors which are shaping her destiny. She has a population which she cannot maintain out of her domestic resources. It increases by nearly a million babies a year. The Japanese people can only live by working up the raw materials which they must obtain abroad and

marketing the product abroad. Japan must become an industrial nation or go under. In China she finds her nearest and largest market; in Manchuria, coal, oil, iron, and the soya bean. Japan's naval strategy is focussed on maintaining command of the Japan Sea and so keeping open her communications with Manchuria. If she were shut in her islands by a powerful enemy, Japan would have no choice but surrender. Exaggerated ideas are in the air concerning the value of Manchuria as a solvent of Japan's problem of maintaining her population at the standard of comfort which education has taught it to demand; yet it is indisputable that, as an essential part of her national defense and as a supplementary source of minerals, raw materials and food, still unoccupied and unused to anything like its capacity, free access to Manchuria is indispensable to Japan. The bony framework of economic reality is but thinly covered in the East, and the need and the power of Japan cannot be ignored.

Do these vital necessities and claims come in conflict with the necessities and the claims of the United States? Is there any reason why these two national expansions, Japan's and America's, should ever meet in serious rivalry? When that question is plainly asked the whole paraphernalia of the alarmist falls to pieces. Strains will be unavoidable; mistakes will be made and misunderstandings will arise. But the situation is free of the entanglement of fears and commitments which

swept the European statesmen into war in 1914. The expansions of Japan and the United States are not in each other's way, strategically or commercially. The fortifications of Hawaii, necessary for the defense of the Pacific seaboard, imply no threat to Japan, nor does the construction of a new line of communication between Japan and Manchuria over an invulnerable inland sea, cause uneasiness to America. American motor-cars, oil, machinery and tobacco do not compete with Japan's textiles and miscellaneous goods.

The Japanese would not defend every detail of their policy in China since 1915. They would, however, plead that conditions in China are not "a fire on the other side of the river," but more vital to them than conditions in Mexico or the Caribbean states are to America; and that where action was unavoidable, some allowance should be made for error. They can also show that periods of benevolent non-interference have alternated with periods when the strong hand was employed, which supports the presumption that the latter was tried because the former had failed. The success with which the naval and immigration difficulties were overcome justifies confidence that Japanese and American statesmanship will not ultimately be defeated by any phase of the China question.

This is admirable so far as it goes, and the immigration act and the armaments question will be considered in subsequent

chapters. But even then we shall not have cleared the atmosphere. If America is not to be another bad boy among Japan's neighbors, thus making the case unanimous, "the imponderables" must be remembered. And as this book is nothing unless frank, I am going to include in it a perfectly frank letter from a genuine but sorely troubled friend of Japan who sends it to me from America with permission to use it exactly as I please, provided I do not divulge his name. He is especially well informed, and no more ignorant of Japan than the majority of well-informed Americans.

Driving directly to the point, my friend writes —

that the attitude of the Japanese seems to be rather inviting a war than an attempt to avoid one. This has found expression here in America from Japanese military visitors who are credited with the use of the old-time German slogan of "Der Tag." Added to that view of the militarists has been the (greater or less) rudeness of Japanese replies to official notes and expressions.

A war would be a frightful contest, costing us much in lives, and the possibility that Japan could and would take and hold the Pacific coast for some time. I must believe that intelligent and

humane Japanese, such as your friends, are averse to such a ruinous combat, and with that belief I present some thoughts for their consideration.

EXCLUSION

It is evident that Japan takes the Exclusion act as an insult. To Americans it is quite the contrary; it is something of a compliment, as it was an admission on our part that we cannot compete with the Japanese in frugality, industry and capacity, particularly in agriculture. It is in fact a confession of their superiority.

It seems quite probable that the stupidity in the passage of that act will be remedied and their people put on the quota basis.

But the Japanese resentment of our action illustrates their retention of a strong feudal trait in a possession of a national dignity that considers a certain sacredness, a touch of divinity, surrounds the Japanese sense of honor.

The Occidental world has long ago abandoned such beliefs. We can respect the Japanese in such beliefs but to us they are outmoded. So on that subject it seems quite impossible for one people to understand the other.

NATIONAL PRIDE

At the Olympiad notice was served on reporters and press correspondents that Japan resented the use of the term "Japs" in referring to Japanese contestants, so the diminutive was dropped. Another detail wherein comprehension is bogged. If

we contested in sports in Mexico and our men were termed "Gringos" or "Yanks" no one of us could or would possibly take offense.

Some years ago when a revival of Gilbert and Sullivan's "Mikado" was proposed in London, representations were officially made to the British government that such a production would be distasteful to the Japanese government, and London at once forbade the performance. If Gilbert and Sullivan had written an opera having fun with English royalty it would have been taken as it was intended it should be, with a laugh. Many of our Presidents have been violently abused by European statesmen and newspapers, but no American ever felt that we should as a nation resent expressions of political opinion, and yet I venture our people would be as keen to resent an insult to our national honor as the Japanese; but it would have to be a real insult, not a fancied one. This is another detail of not understanding each other.

CHINA AND MANCHURIA

We may as well admit that so-called Christian Occidental nations are hypocritical. We may expound our sympathy for China, but back of that sympathy is our desire to keep and develop what may be an enormous market for our goods. Some of us (myself among the number, for I have long been a Japanophile, respecting and admiring that country, not particularly for its acceptance of our civilization, but rather for the beautiful and noble

traits of its own culture) can understand Japan's necessity for more space in the sun. But China, by its age, by its gentleness, by its grand inertness, has largely captured our imagination and our deep interest. Its very pride and invariable sense of superiority has caused us to admire that nation's impermeability. So when it seemed to us that Japan with German ruthlessness and efficiency attacked that people we did feel a resentment of the act. We no longer hate the Germans but we do detest German militarism. Taking Pu' Yi, a Chinese ex-emperor, and making him head of the new Manchurian state seemed to us an error of judgment, unworthy of a direct-minded people. Making Pu' Yi chief of state was theatrical rather than dramatic. And the assertions of Japan's foreign office, daily contradicted by her field forces, injured her in Occidental minds.

When one of the Tokyo statesmen came out with the flat brave remark, "We must have Manchuria no matter what other nations think," there was something we could understand, and respect for its gallant courage.

Our people have even yet not lost the shock and dislike caused by Japan's attacking Russia without the formality of a declaration of war. That is another act we cannot comprehend. The principles of the duello are ours in making war; the punctilio of the code must be observed. When dueling was recognized, if a man attacked and killed another without a challenge, it was merely murder.

So it seems to a most friendly and admiring friend of Japan that her people have largely put on Occidental civilization as one puts on a coat,—outside, but not in the soul. It seems quite possible that they still follow the tenets of their feudal era although they wear top hats, play baseball, and tune in on the radio. And, admiring them as I do, I am not sure that in so doing they are wrong. Their ancient theories were developed naturally and befittingly. Who can say they are not better for them than our questionable theories and practices?

THERE IS BUT ONE WAY FOR BOTH NATIONS TO
ADVANCE WITHOUT THE RUINOUS
CLASH OF WAR

That would be by patient recognition of our basic differences and the philosophic determination not to imperil each other's existence by a war which would destroy one or the other, if not both.

If it were possible for us to study each other patiently and forbearingly, with a restraint of our prejudices and a conscientious determination to avoid anger and insolence, it might be, in time, that all that now seems to threaten could be reduced to a safe understanding and a mutual esteem.

That esteem on our part now exists. The last thing we want is a war. But the last thing we would or could endure would be an insolent, forcible over-riding of our tenets.

All advances in international understanding have, it is true, been a result of wars. But is it not possible that the world has now arrived at a stage of reason that might permit the old adage, "Make haste slowly," to work out a solution of the conditions that beset both peoples?

If they can put up with our stupidities in the form of prejudices and if we can arrest our tendency to over-resent certain actions taking the form of what we consider insults, or at least insolences, it may be possible for us both finally to arrive at a degree of mutual esteem and comprehension that will permit us both to advance to the fulfilment of our respective destinies.

We both should deeply consider those "imponderables" which, as Bismarck recognized, are more powerful than army corps or massive artillery; then we might have a chance to avoid the ruin of conflict. It was the neglect of calculating the potency of those imponderables that caused Germany to lose the World War. Military people are apt to figure that war is like a chess game; that certain moves must lead to definite predictable results. This is not true. If it were true, Germany would have won the World War in a year. It is the combination of sentiment and of thought that in the finality determines world events.

Japan has the strong arm. If to that she adds the strong intellect she will not need army corps or big guns to secure her rights on the path of progress, so far as we are concerned.

The reasoning way is the slower, but it is the only safe way.

We do admire the Japanese, we do respect them, we do earnestly desire that they should achieve what they feel is their destiny. If we knew them as thoroughly as we know the English, the French, or any European people, diplomats and writers could and would bring about a satisfactory settlement of all differences. But we are each mutually ignorant of the deeper facts of the other. The removal of that ignorance should be the first duty of all good Japanese and of all good Americans.

Assuming that the Japanese do not lust for war with America, and knowing that we do not at all want war with them, it does seem at least possible that the jingoes in both countries might be restrained long enough to let each people learn more, and thereby better understand each other.

We both must realize that a crisis of hostility may have, in fact would be sure to have, consequences of so far-reaching a nature that no man can foretell the result.

Let us return for a moment to the whimsical "confession" with which this chapter was opened. In my turn I must "confess" that my country is somewhat like a big boy who has never been far enough away from home. "If you have a pet child," says the Japanese proverb, "send

him traveling." America needs to travel in the Far East, especially in Japan, which is so easily accessible and so thoroughly enjoyable; and get jolted out of a smug provincialism. My people call England insular, but we are insular on a continental scale. And religious bigotry not only adds to our self-complacency but makes us offensively boorish. One "imponderable" that *we* certainly must get over is the superiority complex. That may not be good psycho-analysis, but it is plain English. Because we have stayed at home or gone only to Europe and because so many of us have been brought up on flapdoodle* even a Secretary of State has been known to speak of the Philippines as islands of enlightenment in an ocean of orientalism. To anybody who really knows the Far East, that is rot. Has not the time come for Americans to stop patronizing the cultured people of Asia as so many "heathen," and to try to treat them with the consideration and courtesy in which they so far excel us? Politeness has been defined by a sage as morality in trifles, but in international affairs there is nothing trivial about it. It smooths down the friction

* This is a perfectly good word. See Standard Dictionary.

points, and it is friction that flames up into war.

It must be confessed that in some respects America is just a big boy. Perhaps, until The Depression struck him, he was a big spoiled boy. But not a big bad boy. His heart is sound, his head can learn.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

“You jockeyed us!”

HIS statement is quite untrue, but he believes it. If a good many other prominent Japanese believe it, a flood of light is thrown on their attitude regarding the Nine-Power Treaty. That treaty grew out of the Washington Conference of 1921, and, while two wrongs never make a right, it is only human to try to jockey yourself out of a “jam” you have been jockeyed into. To change the figure, if I find myself trapped in a narrow room with the door and the windows locked I am quite likely to take advantage of the fact that windows, after all, are but glass, and shatter them. Afterwards, if the gentleman with the key in his pocket comes to me with grieved reproaches, claiming that I had been locked in for my own good, and of my own free will, I may point out to him that I needed air, and that, after all, I didn’t break down the door. I may even recall to his memory some previous occasion when it seemed to me that I detected him in the

act of shattering an inconvenient window. The bearing of this little parable may come clear during the course of this chapter.

To back up his assertion that America jockeyed Japan at Washington, my Japanese friend placed in my hands a copy of J. O. P. Bland's new book, "China: the Pity of It." As a description of the present situation in China and the conditions leading up to it, Mr. Bland's book is excellent; perhaps the best single volume on the subject. His chapter on Manchuria is really masterly, and should be widely read in Japan. But Mr. Bland is a dyed-in-the-wool British Tory, and whenever Uncle Sam steps into the story he sees red. The clue to his view of Japanese-American relations appears on page 253, where he pronounces them *irreconcilable*. That is ridiculous. In writing of the Washington Conference he does not use the word "jockey," but he does use the word "manœuvre" (more than once), which comes to the same thing. Apparently ignorant of the well-known fact that President Theodore Roosevelt had the co-operation of Japan itself when he intervened to end the Russo-Japanese War, Mr. Bland envisages him as the energetic heir of an unbroken American policy—dating

back to President Monroe!—to monopolize China as a market for American goods. Japan, as a vigorous young rival, must be checked on every possible occasion. Thus, presumably, President Roosevelt checked her in her conquest of Russia; thus, assuredly—according to Mr. Bland—President Harding and Secretary Hughes checked her at Washington by jockeying her out of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, jockeying her out of an adequate naval defense, and jockeying her into a Nine-Power Treaty in which she agrees forever to respect the territorial integrity of China.

This is a most mischievous perversion of the truth. When one's own country is in dispute, sometimes it serves to call in an outside observer. In this case an Englishman is answered by an Englishman, Mr. Hugh Byas, already quoted, in an article that was printed in Japan before Mr. Bland's book reached here. Presenting the incontrovertible facts, Mr. Byas says that before the Washington Conference —

approximately one-third of Japan's national revenue was being spent on naval preparedness. The largest item in this tremendous bill was the cost of constructing a new fleet of 16 capital ships, the

answer to a corresponding programme of 16 capital ships then being built in the United States. After what had followed the naval rivalry of Germany and Great Britain, it is astonishing that the competition in armaments of the Pacific Powers did not arouse public opinion in both countries to a lively sense of alarm. Their relations, as expressed in armaments, were about as bad as they could be, short of war.

Public insensitiveness is perhaps explained by the fact that though this ominous competition coincided with a period of political strain caused by the immigration question and Chinese affairs, its inception was due to different causes. In 1916 the United States Administration, not yet at war but profoundly disturbed by German submarine attacks and British interference with neutral shipping, authorized the construction of 16 capital ships in three years. In 1916 Japan replied with a building programme of 12. American entry into the war postponed the capital ship programme, but it was revived after the peace. Between 1918 and 1921 the keels authorized by the 1916 programme were laid down, and Japan followed suit by expanding her programme of 12 capital ships to one of 16.

In face of these figures it is idle to pretend that Japan and the United States were not engaged in an armaments competition of the most menacing kind. Yet it can be said that the competition was not at first deliberate. The American programme

was a war measure; its revival after the war was over was due to President Wilson's expectation that the United States would become a member of the League of Nations, and should enter the League fully equipped to exercise power and influence commensurate with America's position in the world. America did not join the League, and her abstention strengthened the case for a navy strong enough to defend American interests single-handed. The doctrine of parity with the strongest was evolved to support the naval claims. Whereas in 1916 Mr. Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, had declared, "It has never been suggested seriously that our nation should attempt to equal in the number of ships the greatest navy in the world," the General Board of the Navy in 1920 recommended the building of a fleet "equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation in the world."

It seems difficult for Governments to realize that armament programmes, though accompanied by the best of intentions, may create a sense of insecurity in other countries. It appeared to the Japanese that measures of preparedness, justified while war was raging, became unnecessary after the war was over, and the rapid construction of a powerful American fleet was a concrete fact. Each new dreadnought laid down in an American yard called up its "opposite number" in Japan.

Fortunately, an act of the highest statesmanship, conceived by the Administration of President

Harding, and carried to success with the loyal co-operation of Japan, ended the race in armaments. Both capital ship programmes were extinguished by the Washington Conference, and a revolutionary improvement was effected in the situation. At the same time Japan made important concessions in her China policy. Her succession to the German interests in Shantung, which the Versailles Conference had confirmed, was surrendered, and the Nine-Power Treaty, reaffirming the principles of non-aggression in China, the open door and equal commercial opportunity, was concluded. America undertook not to construct a naval base at Guam, thereby voluntarily imposing upon herself a serious restriction of naval mobility. The limitation of capital ships to a fixed ratio and the agreement not to fortify Guam amounted to a guarantee that the American fleet would not attack Japan in Far Eastern waters; while Japan's acceptance of an inferior proportion was a corresponding pledge that her fleet would not attack American territory or possessions. Each country had laid down the power to take offensive action against the other. Seldom have national rivalries in armaments been ended so sanely. It is true that the limitation of capital ships did not inaugurate the millennium. The competition was transferred, in a less dangerous form, to cruisers, but the Washington method was successfully carried a stage further at London, and for ten years Japanese-American relations have been free of the appalling strain of the

fear of immediate war which completion of their naval programmes would have created. None who witnessed in the Far East the "before" and "after" of the Washington Conference can despair of similar efforts to regulate international relations.

Everything Mr. Byas says is true, but unfortunately there were certain aspects of the Washington Conference of which Mr. Bland's account is correct. Chinese propaganda was so skilfully directed as to throw an aureole around the figment of an orderly democracy in Asia. President Wilson had already drilled it into the American people that the world must be made safe for democracy, and now they thrilled to the idea of huge China in the ranks of the republics and governing itself after ages of alien rule. That it had not yet governed itself, that it was in fact chaos, nobody mentioned. Altruistic organizations brought pressure to bear on Washington, backing up the high-powered propaganda directed from Canton. All this is eminently true, as Mr Bland charges. It is also true that when that sapient Frenchman, Aristide Briand, asked early in the Conference "*What is China?*" his all-important question was brushed brusquely aside. Armament reduc-

tion was the big business in hand, so why delay it with an academic discussion? M. Briand's question was as far removed as possible from the realm of the merely academic, and if it had not been brushed brusquely aside perhaps Japan would not have waged war in Manchuria. Manchuria was loosely assumed as belonging to the new Asiatic democracy, together with other vast borderlands that have never been actually Chinese. Then, when armament reduction had been achieved, a treaty was rushed through guaranteeing forever the territorial integrity of China!

Apart from its important achievement in naval reduction, the Washington Conference is chiefly significant in pointing the homely maxim that "haste makes waste."

To curious observers, Japan, at that Conference, seemed to be dazed. She was in the grip of circumstances too strong for her. Looking backward, it is easy to say that she should have insisted on an answer to M. Briand's question, and that she should also have challenged the right of anarchic China to be treated as an ordered government. But to criticize Japan for her sins of omission at Washington is to forget the

sweep and rush of that hurricane of organized emotion.

Japan is now urging the questions on which she felt constrained to remain silent at Washington. When other powers point to her signature to the Nine-Power Treaty, she can only remind them that there was once such a thing as a "Gentlemen's Agreement" with America regarding immigration, and also a Treaty of 1911, both of which were shattered, and not by her, without so much as a gesture of by-your-leave. While such reminders may not justify her in the shattering of windows, she certainly is justified in quoting the old adage about throwing stones.

As to her fidelity regarding the naval reductions, Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1923 bore the following testimony:

Nearly a year and a half ago the Washington Conference terminated its work and signed the naval agreement. Great Britain, Japan and the United States—the three parties chiefly affected by it—promptly ratified it. . . . Great Britain has faithfully lived up to her part of the agreement. Japan, contrary to her tactics on certain past occasions, has lived up not only to the letter but to the spirit of the treaty. Premier Hara, in sending his delegation to the Washington Confer-

ence, emphasized the chance thus afforded his nation and government to become established on a new basis of faith. Under the leadership of Premier Kato, the government seized this opportunity. It has indeed been at pains to show the highest form of *bona fides* in connection with the engagements entered into at Washington, even though each and every one of the terms to which the Japanese delegates subscribed involved some national sacrifice, of prestige, of political ambition, of dignity.

With regard to the scrapping of capital ships, the peculiar situation in which Japan's chief delegate found himself has escaped due appreciation. Admiral Kato, it must be remembered, was the creator of the Japanese navy. When therefore as a member of the big three of sea-power he was called upon to vote for drastic naval disarmament, and later on obliged as premier to carry out to the letter his national undertaking, he was performing a renunciatory act far more searching than the colder statesmanship of Mr. Hughes or Mr. Balfour. Kato and his colleagues, at the instance of a rival naval power, that power whose naval rivalry was most immediately threatening to Japan, were called upon to destroy what he himself had patiently created and built up during sixteen years of serious political and financial difficulties.

Kato proved himself capable of that great gesture and, what is more important, capable also of the less dramatic performance. . . . The scrap-

ping of naval vessels condemned by the treaty has gone forward faster in Japan than in this country. The historic naval base at Port Arthur, endeared to the Japanese by every consideration of national sentiment, has been abandoned, and the larger one on the Japanese mainland at Maizuru has also been dismantled. It may be contended that neither of these stations has great strategical value, but this is an open question. In any event, the Japanese have carried out their pledge.

On July 2, 1922, the Japanese withdrew their garrison of five hundred men from Hankow on the Yangtze and on October 26 of last year evacuated Siberia, according to their treaty engagements, with the last of a division which approximated twelve thousand men. About a month later they gave up their radio station on Russian Island, Siberia. Later they gave up all their post offices in China with the exception of those retained along the line of their South Manchuria railway. This was precisely according to agreement.

It may be remembered that the Chinese delegates at Versailles refused to sign the peace document because of the reservation to Japan therein of the German rights and claims to the sacred province of Shantung. Japan's signature to the peace was contingent upon that reservation. Shantung was expressly the *sine qua non* of Japanese adherence to the peace of Versailles. Shantung was the gist of the twenty-one demands. And yet on September 14, 1922, Japan withdrew

from Shantung, handing over everything to the Chinese, in accordance with her Washington pledges, amid the astonished contemplation of the journalists of the world and of the dumbfounded Chinese themselves. Joint administration of the railroad was continued as agreed upon. In this latter case of very material sacrifice the irreconcilables point out that Japan in reality gained in the long run more than she lost in Shantung. A Chinese boycott had crippled her trade in this, one of the richest provinces in the republic, these critics explain, and Japanese policies and ambitions in Shantung were rapidly stirring up a national resentment throughout China. However that may be, the fact remains that the Kato administration carried out to the letter in Shantung what Admiral Kato signed to do at Washington.

These, then, are the facts. It seems a pity that our own government failed to enlighten the ignorance of the nation on matters of such vital importance. . . . If our government would spend half the energy in disseminating this healing kind of information that it wastes in creating misapprehensions about its own policy, the whole country would benefit thereby materially and morally.

VI

IMMIGRATION

“It rankles like a cancer!”

THIS confession greatly surprised me. It was uttered by one of the mildest of Japanese noblemen, famed for his friendship for America. He was speaking of the Federal Immigration Act of 1924, which I had been told had become a dead issue. Conversation with other leading Japanese convinces me that it is not a dead issue, hence this chapter. It seems desirable to review the history of events leading up to the passage of the objectionable Act, and to present the American point of view. In doing so I shall draw freely from one of my earlier books on Japan, first published just after the Immigration Act was passed.

California, in the person of Commodore Perry, knocked at Japan's gates in 1853, but it was thirty years before the Japanese began to return this friendly call in such numbers as to attract public notice. Then they made up for lost time. Between 1885 and 1900 the flow of Japanese labor into

California increased at such a rate that a mass-meeting held in San Francisco in the last-mentioned year adopted resolutions urging Congress to re-enact the Chinese Exclusion Law, and also to take the necessary steps to exclude all Japanese immigrants except members of the diplomatic staff.

But this was only the act of a city. The state at large showed scant interest until 1905, when the *San Francisco Chronicle* began to uncover the facts. By this time 36 emigration companies had been organized in Japan, with capital assets ranging from 20,000 to 1,000,000 yen each, while the Japanese population of California had grown from 86 in 1880 to 50,000 in 1905.

An Asiatic Exclusion League now sprang up in San Francisco, where organized labor wielded such political influence as to prevail on the Board of Education to undertake the segregation of Oriental pupils in the city schools. After the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, a separate school order was actually issued, so wounding the pride of Japan that President Theodore Roosevelt sprang to her defense. In his Autobiography his comments on the consequences of this episode richly repay repetition. The obnox-

ious school legislation was abandoned, and the President arranged the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement. In this Agreement the Japanese undertook to prevent any emigration of their laboring people to America, it being distinctly understood that if there was such emigration the United States would at once pass an exclusion law.

After Colonel Roosevelt left the presidency, a less considerate policy was pursued toward Japan, culminating in the Treaty of 1911. Criticizing this treaty, Colonel Roosevelt says that the Gentlemen's Agreement had "worked admirably, and entirely achieved its purpose. No small part of our success was due to the fact that we succeeded in impressing on the Japanese that we sincerely admired and respected them, and desired to treat them with the utmost consideration. . . . The Japanese are one of the great nations of the world, entitled to stand, and standing, on a footing of full equality with any nation of Europe or America." But, he adds, —

it is eminently undesirable that Japanese and Americans should attempt to live together in masses; any such attempt would be sure to result disastrously, and the far-seeing statesmen of both countries should join to prevent it. But this is

not because either nation is inferior to the other; it is because they are different. The two peoples represent two civilizations which, although in many respects equally high, are so totally distinct in their past history that it is idle to expect in one or two generations to overcome this difference. One civilization is as old as the other; and in neither case is the line of cultural descent coincident with that of ethnic descent. Unquestionably the ancestors of the great majority both of the modern Americans and the modern Japanese were barbarians in that remote past which saw the origins of the cultured peoples to which the Americans and the Japanese of today severally trace their civilizations. But the lines of development of these two civilizations, of the Orient and the Occident, have been separate and divergent since thousands of years before the Christian era; certainly since that hoary eld in which the Akkadian predecessors of the Chaldean Semites held sway in Mesopotamia. An effort to mix together, out of hand, the peoples representing the culminating points of two such lines of divergent cultural development would be fraught with peril; and this, I repeat, because the two are different, not because either is inferior to the other. Wise statesmen, looking to the future, will for the present endeavor to keep the two nations from mass contact and intermingling, precisely because they wish to keep each in relations of permanent good will and friendship with the other.

Colonel Roosevelt thought that the Gentlemen's Agreement "worked admirably and entirely achieved its purpose," but in this opinion California refused to concur. In the very year in which he wrote the foregoing statement—1913—the California legislature sought to devise an alien land law that would check a growing economic danger without violating stipulated treaty rights. Against this proposed legislation an ever-watchful Japanese government made such strong representations at Washington that the new Wilson administration took a very venturesome step. Its Secretary of State, Mr. William Jennings Bryan, traveled across the continent as a would-be peacemaker. But the coming of the great pacifist was not attended with pacific results. The human equation became the determining factor in an all-important issue. Had not Mr. Bryan's party just defeated Governor Hiram Johnson as candidate for the vice-presidency of the United States? Certainly Governor Johnson seemed to construe the visit of the Democratic leader, Mr. Bryan, as a challenge to his political strength in his own state. Immediately he got behind the proposed alien land law with an energy and deter-

mination he had not hitherto manifested in regard to it, as if determined to devise it in such fashion as to outmatch and outwit Washington. With three able assistants, this he succeeded in doing. After Mr. Bryan had exhausted his eloquence on the Sacramento legislators, they enacted, almost un-animously, an ingenious administration measure which brought into existence a now famous phrase, "aliens ineligible to citizenship."

Section One of this first of California's alien land laws carefully conserved all the rights of aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States. Section Two conserved the rights of all aliens "other than those mentioned in Section One, in the manner and to the extent and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing between the government of the United States and the nation or country of which such alien is a citizen or subject, *and not otherwise*;" the framers of this ingenious measure having first satisfied themselves on the all-important point that the treaties then in force with Japan nowhere gave Japanese subjects the right to own land.

This measure, therefore, denied Japanese

that privilege in California. Superficially, however, it seemed more generous than the Treaty of 1911, through conferring on ineligible aliens the privilege of leasing land for agricultural purposes,—for terms of three years,—whereas the Treaty had only granted such leases for commercial and residential purposes. Of course what the California law really did was to substitute three-year land leases for the actual ownership hitherto enjoyed by the Japanese in California.

Needless to say, eligibility to United States citizenship is a matter for determination by the Federal government, which, in fact, had already determined it (so long ago as 1790) as an exclusive prerogative of “free white persons.” Soon after the Civil War the voting privilege was extended to Negroes by constitutional amendment, so that citizenship in the United States would seem to be based mainly on pigmentary distinctions, favoring the fast white and black colors as against intermediate shades of complexion, such as yellow or brown.

But the law is the law, in spite of its manifest absurdities; and, in a phrase of the day, Sacramento put it up to Washington with an ultimate success that California’s

politicians themselves never dreamed of in 1913. For when, eleven years later, Washington itself became a convert to California's point of view, Congress adopted for the entire country the very phrase that the Japanese had found so obnoxious in a single state, by restricting the immigration of all aliens "ineligible to citizenship."

The Federal government would hardly have become converted to the Californian point of view in such a short time had it not been for the Great War. War-time disclosures of disloyalty and sedition among unassimilated European "hyphenates" at length roused national attention to the peril of unrestricted immigration. Hence one of the post-war measures of Congress undertook the rigid restriction of European immigration, by means of a quota allowance proportional to the number of nationals already in the United States, no change being made or proposed at that time (1921) in the arrangement with Japan.

Recognition of racial equality had become a prime object of Japan's foreign policy soon after she obtained the recognition of political equality in 1895. In her diplomatic dealings with the United States she pressed this new

claim so far (if Ambassador Hanihara's authority may be accepted) as to be unwilling to accept a formal treaty in place of the Gentlemen's Agreement, which left the regulation of her emigrants in her own hands. She made this recognition of racial equality her primary concern at Versailles, and it was only after this imponderable prize had been denied to her that she shifted to tangible booty, and obtained from that Conference of a Thousand Blunders the Shantung Peninsula—but without China's consent.

The post-war American immigration measure was so framed as to call for revision in 1924, and when that time came California meanwhile had made such headway with a nation-wide "campaign of education" that uninformed censure of her attitude toward Oriental immigration gave way to a widespread sympathy. To illustrate: the press of the rest of the country used to address certain caustic questions to California, but to these questions the state finally succeeded in giving reasonably satisfactory answers. Why, for example, should she arrogate to herself a paramount interest in a problem that involved the nation as a whole?

To this question California replied that the problem was peculiarly her own because almost all of the Japanese arriving in America arrived through her ports, and, finding her climate and soil congenial, never crossed the state border. That, owing to this fact, 100,000 of the 150,000 Japanese in the continental United States were domiciled within her borders, or two-thirds of the total number; the state of Washington coming next with about one-sixth, and Oregon and Idaho ranking nearly together as the only other states where the numbers were mark-worthy. That, even if further immigration should be entirely shut off, California would still have to reckon with a large annual increment of American-born Japanese, owing to the steady increase of immigrant Japanese women. The ratio of Japanese males to females in the continental United States was 25 to 1 in 1890, less than 7 to 1 in 1910, and less than 2 to 1 in 1920. That these immigrant women scorned birth-control was indicated by birth counts showing that during a given year only 99 children were born to 1,000 native California women, in comparison with 288 to 1,000 Japanese. About one-twelfth of all births in California are Japanese, who con-

stitute only one-thirtieth of the state's population. Further, this one-thirtieth of the population managed to acquire agricultural control of one-sixth of all the irrigated land, water being the limiting factor in Pacific Coast agriculture. On this sixth of the land Japanese farmers and horticulturists were producing one-third of the total California crop values, an acreage value just double that of the native born, who simply could not compete with them and maintain their own accustomed standard of living. Moreover, the Japanese so tended to concentrate in certain favored agricultural sections as to drive out the whites altogether. Virtually all of the Japanese resided in the richest counties. In some of these counties a majority of the registered births were reported as being Japanese. In a few counties Japanese occupied fully half of the irrigated area.

In view of facts like these, it may be seen that so far from charging racial or moral inferiority against the Japanese, California's contention based itself on an implicit recognition of their superior economy and industry. As the editor of the *San Francisco Chronicle* summed it up, the Japanese are a race "fully as capable as our own, and

having the added advantage of being inured by centuries of self-denial to a mode of life to which we do not wish to conform, even if we had the ability to do so." Professor H. A. Millis, in a highly sympathetic study of "The Japanese Problem in the United States," compressed the economic argument into six words: "Immigration involves a conflict of standards." Friendly as he is to Japan, he then adds that "a narrow restriction of immigration of Asiatics is necessary if standards are not to be lowered on the Pacific Coast, where most would enter the country and where most of those who enter would remain."

In this mood and with this conviction Congress took up the revision of its new immigration measure in the spring of 1924, and there is reason to think that Japanese immigration would have been treated in a manner satisfactory to Japan had not two men blundered. When Ambassador Hanihara became aware that certain members of Congress favored a rigid restriction of incoming Japanese as "aliens ineligible to citizenship," he said in a letter to the Secretary of State that such action would be followed by "grave consequences" (*jūdai naru kekkwa*). Secre-

tary Hughes, a great lawyer but a poor psychologist, sympathized with the Japanese Ambassador to such an extent that he transmitted this indiscreet protest to Congress. Congress, interpreting the phrase in question as a threat of war, promptly passed the measure in its objectionable form, and also abrogated the Treaty of 1911, with its incorporation of the Gentlemen's Agreement.

This action entirely and immediately nullified the friendly feelings that had been incited in Japan by America's response to the suffering caused by the Great Earthquake of 1923. Japan, with characteristic courtesy, had expressed appreciation of that response in almost unmeasured terms, of which the following statement from Mr. K. K. Kawakami may serve as an example:

Japan will see America in a new light. It is as if hearts of a hundred million Americans have gone forth in sympathy for the grieving souls of Japan. Such disinterested sacrifices, such magnanimous spirit, such whole-hearted response to the call of humanity as have been seen in this American relief undertaking cannot fail to soften even a heart of flint. This rebirth, so to speak, of Japanese friendliness towards America cannot fail to influence diplomatic relations between the two

governments. When Mr. Hanihara was leaving Japan last March as Ambassador to Washington, the Japanese press was full of "stories" and editorials, surmising that the new envoy would undertake to secure a revision of the "gentlemen's agreement" so as to safeguard Japanese rights in America, particularly on the Pacific Coast. If Mr. Hanihara, when leaving Japan, had in his pocket instructions to open negotiations on the Japanese question, the earthquake consigned those instructions to limbo.

Mr. Hanihara himself was so moved by the perfectly natural response of America to Japan in the hour of need that he wrote in *Asia* for December, 1923:

For many years I have been devoting my efforts to the task of convincing my countrymen that the heart of America is not only sound but kindly. I have lived among Americans long enough to know. In spite of my efforts, however, and those of many friends, the understanding we sought to bring about was not complete. But now, at one stroke, the response of America, spontaneous and open-handed, has displayed to my countrymen the generous, innermost heart of America, and my countrymen, through this intervention of Providence, have reached a final knowledge of the truth.

A few months after these generous

words were published, Mr. Hanihara wrote his unfortunate letter to Secretary Hughes, who unfortunately transmitted it to Congress, which unfortunately resented the seeming threat of a foreign envoy to such an extent that it promptly passed an Immigration Act worded in such terms that they still rankle like a cancer in the hearts of many Japanese.

In the judgement of the present writer, a citizen of California, the time has come to revise the Immigration Act to the form that it would probably have taken except for this thrice unfortunate episode. In other words, Japan should be placed on a quota basis, as with the nations of Europe. Under her quota only about 180 of her nationals could come in annually, a number almost negligible in the vast population of the United States. California is amply protected by her own state laws. There is nothing to lose, and much to gain, by this rectification of a series of errors. Revision was suggested several years ago by various commercial bodies in America, including the Chambers of Commerce of San Francisco and Los Angeles. The author of the original Act was himself in favor of revision. Doubtless the Depression, with the multifold labors which it thrust

upon Congress, explains the delay. For further delay there would seem to be little excuse, provided Japanese jingoism becomes less loquacious.

NOTE:—On the death of Mr. Hanihara in December, 1934, it transpired that the objectionable phrase mentioned on page 72 was not in his original letter at all, but was inserted by him at the suggestion of Secretary Hughes, who thought the original letter too mild. It seems only just to Mr. Hanihara's memory to put this fact on record.

VII

THE CONTROL OF THE ARMY

“It’s hard to hold back our young horses!”

ANOTHER nobleman was speaking, a liberal and a man of peace, popular on many accounts, including his whimsical humor. We had been discussing General Araki, then the most discussed man in Japan. I think I had commented with some surprise on what General Araki had just given out to the press regarding the suicide of Major Koga at Shanghai. Through no fault of his own, and in fact while unconscious from a wound, the young Saga officer had been made a prisoner. After his release he was court-martialed in conformity with the practice of the Japanese army to regard all of its officers falling into the hands of the enemy as guilty of “a dishonor of the greatest magnitude,” to use General Araki’s own phrase. He then visited the tomb of his late commanding officer, made his obeisance, and took his own life. Some of his fellow officers argued that he was to be excused on account of the melancholia from which he

had suffered since his commanding officer's death. General Araki did not take this view at all. Far from "excusing" Major Koga, he cited his suicide as an exemplary act, perpetuating the stern tradition of the ancient *bushi*.

In the mind of Major Koga (said the General), it was intolerable to think that although due to no fault of his, the fact remained that he had been taken prisoner. He decided that only through death could he clear himself of the dishonor. After making up his mind to clear himself of the dishonor, he rushed the drafting of his report. Adjusting everything, he then visited the tomb under which Colonel Hayashi, his regimental commander, slept, and immediately after paying his last respects to his commanding officer he put an end to his life.

It would be wrong to look upon the suicide of Major Koga as a common case of self-immolation. Viewed properly it is a grave question, involving the discipline of the Imperial Army. It is undoubtedly an extreme dishonor for a soldier to be taken prisoner by the enemy, an occurrence, according to daily disciplinary training, worthy of a thousand deaths. Therefore when a soldier is taken prisoner he is invariably court-martialed upon his release, no matter under what circumstances he was made prisoner. Major Koga has shown the Japanese soldier that, whatever the

circumstances, one cannot expect to live after being taken prisoner by the enemy. With his death he has set an admirable example and showed the quality of which a soldier should be made.

Well, I had told my friend of the whimsical humor that this might be magnificent, but it is not modern war. In a big war, such as that of 1914-'18, many thousands of prisoners may be taken captive at one stroke. The offensive power of any army might be fatally impaired if all these valuable soldiers were to commit suicide.

It was then that my witty friend resorted to the figure of the plunging horses. General Araki, according to him, could not afford to neglect any device of leadership. It was only because his soldiers believed in his own high ideals of military prowess, of *Bushidō*, the ancient "way of the warrior," that he was able to control them. "Our young officers over there in Manchuria were selected from our brightest and doughtiest youth, and given the most rigid training. They chafe at the bit. They are like a great team of mettlesome chargers, plunging ahead, dragging at the bit, liable to run away unless they feel the iron hand of the man they know and love. It's hard to hold back our

young horses, and Araki was the man for the hour."

While my prosaic Western mind still held its doubts in the matter of Major Koga, I could follow my friend's line of reasoning. It seems to me that the army is at once Japan's chief pledge of security and also her potential danger.

Certainly General Araki proved himself the man of the hour on the night of the 15th of May, 1932. The army then threatened gravely to get out of hand. A group of cadets and junior naval officers, aided by a "Band of Death" composed of civilians, on that black night assassinated the Premier, threw bombs or attempted to throw bombs in the nerve centers of Tokyo, and made an abortive attempt to paralyze the lighting system of the capital. As a Japanese writer has said, the lives of Japanese statesmen have too often been sacrificed by fanatics, but never before had a terroristic raid for a political object been carried out by men wearing the Emperor's uniform, and it seemed as if Tokyo were menaced with greater perils than it had experienced since the Restoration wars.

Araki hastened to the scene of the murder.

In the presence of his dying chief and his family the War Minister had to face a bitter rebuke. "Your men did it" put the whole significance of the tragedy in a nutshell. But this was not a personal crime; it was a sign that the famous discipline of the Japanese army had been impaired. Those young cadets and officers might flatter themselves that their indignation against politicians was righteous, but they had forgotten that their first and last duty was obedience to the Emperor. In an army order issued a few days later the War Minister reminded the army that its duties are set forth in the rescript of the Emperor Meiji; that the army, as individuals and as a whole, moves only at the Imperial command; that any deviation from this rule is treason.

To a man of Araki's principles, reared in the Japanese code of responsibility, resignation was the unavoidable penalty. He sent it in. The Manchurian affair had begun during the term of office of General Minami and it was generally believed that he was prepared to resume the reins and see it through. Minami was not reappointed. General Hayashi, commander in Chosen, was summoned to Tokyo to take the difficult post. With great courage and judgment, he called the Government's attention to the explosive temper of the army both in Manchuria and throughout the Empire. A false step at that moment, he pointed out, might lead to a far more serious commotion while the excited mood lasted. Araki must remain in the saddle, he

said, to calm the excited feelings of the young officers and restore the iron discipline of the Imperial army. Other officers gave similar advice. It was accepted and Araki thus retained his portfolio.*

Except for his hand at the rein it is easily conceivable that the plunging young chargers over on the plains of Manchuria might have gone even farther than they did. Perhaps it will never be known how far they forced the hand of the Government in the early days of the Manchurian adventure.

In those days one of the things that perplexed the mind of the world was the discrepancy between the pacific assurances of the Tokyo Cabinet and the belligerent news from the field. As my blunt American friend has put it in an earlier chapter, "the assertions of Japan's foreign office, daily contradicted by her field forces, injured her in Occidental minds."

This discrepancy arose from a peculiar feature of Japan's system of government. Mr. Jerome D. Greene, president of the Japan Society of New York, and a distinguished authority in international law, has

* Ippei Fukuda in *Contemporary Japan* for December, 1932. Used by permission of the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan.

described this peculiar feature as a division or ambiguity of responsibility as between the Government represented by the Cabinet, and the military and naval authority who regard their responsibility as being directly to the Throne.

There is also the factor of discretionary power vested in a military commander in the field to act in an emergency to protect his forces, and the nationals for whose safety he is responsible, from an immediate attack, or danger of attack, from opposing forces. It is my opinion that the military action taken by the Japanese on September 18 (1931) was actually the use, or abuse, of the discretionary power to which I have just referred. The action once taken, however, was backed up by the highest military authorities, while the civil authorities, taken unawares by the whole proceeding, were forced to make the best of it. They did so by minimizing the scope and importance of the outbreak and by giving to the other Powers assurances of Japanese self-restraint which they were subsequently unable to make good, owing to the emergence of the military part of the Government as sole masters of the situation. There is no reason to doubt the good faith in which these assurances were given by the civil government; and it is easy to imagine the embarrassment and chagrin which it suffered when they were belied by events. Inasmuch, however, as the Foreign

Office remained as the channel of communication with the outside world, an attempt had to be made to rationalize the whole procedure after the event—a process which was facilitated by the normal growth of the war spirit to the point where national unanimity was virtually attained, at least so far as the feeling of the people was articulate. . . . The conflict or ambiguity of authority in Japan has also been masked to some extent by . . . the Cabinet changes which have taken place recently, all of which reflect a greater harmony, if not a real unity, of authority; but the latent disunity remains as a grave constitutional defect which I believe the Japanese people would like to see changed by the same process as that which established the Constitution, namely, by the free and complete delegation by the Throne of the responsibilities of national defence to a government wholly and unequivocally responsible to Parliament.*

Mr. Greene's friendship for Japan appears in the italicized quotation from this same speech given on page 122. His opinion is entitled to respect in the present instance also.

It is my own conviction that Japan is peculiarly fortunate in the personal character of her present military leadership. General

* An address delivered before the World Affairs Institute in New York, March 23, 1932; printed in Bulletin No. 281 of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Araki is a man of great gentleness, and genuine delicacy of feeling. He is described by his devoted friend and second-in-command, General Masaki, as a man of singular purity of heart. No doubt General Masaki uses this phrase in the Shintō sense of unselfishness and singleness of purpose. At any rate General Araki impresses me as a sincere and entirely unselfish zealot, thoroughly imbued with *Yamato Damashii* or *Nippon Seishin*, and resolved at any cost to himself to protect his country and to assist in the achievement of what he conceives to be its destiny. General Masaki, who for several years was my pupil and is now an intimate friend, richly deserves his wide popularity. Modest to the point of self-effacement, a man of deep human feeling as well as unquestioned ability, he discharges his duties as a member of the Supreme War Council in a manner that defies criticism. But can Japan reasonably expect always to have such leaders? Should she not take advantage of her present good fortune in respect of military leadership to correct that "grave constitutional defect" to which Mr. Greene alludes?

General Araki, like General Masaki, expresses friendly feelings for America. The

message he gave me for our people, printed in an earlier chapter, speaks for itself. Knowing of my friendship with the late President Theodore Roosevelt, and that Mrs. Roosevelt was soon to spend a day in Japan on her way to Manila, he said with the most perfect courtesy that if he could do so without interfering with her plans, he would like even two minutes of her time, so as to express his admiration of her Husband. Through Ambassador Grew this meeting was arranged. Mrs. Roosevelt afterwards described to me with unconcealed delight the charming and touching speech which General Araki made to her, in manifestly sincere admiration not only of the late President but also of the country over which he ruled.

I trust that no cynical reader of this book will think me fool enough to believe for a moment that in a serious disagreement between Japan and America General Araki and General Masaki would not expend every ounce of their energy in behalf of Japan. On the other hand, they convinced me not only that they prefer peace to war, but that they do admire America, and deeply wish to cultivate our good will. While I cannot in every respect agree with their policies or ad-

mire their ideals, I do plead for a more sympathetic attitude toward them and the intricate problems they are called on to face.

VIII

YAMATO DAMASHII
OR
NIPPON SEISHIN

*“The flag of Great Japan will wave above
all the world!”*

IN the preceding chapter mention was made of “Japanese spirit,” formerly called *Yamato Damashii* and now more popularly known as *Nippon Seishin*. Whatever other elements may enter into this somewhat elusive national attribute, loyalty must certainly be reckoned in. Inculcated from time immemorial as the supreme virtue in the guise of filial piety, its obligations were gradually extended to all superiors, the obligation becoming the more intense as the scale ascends, until it culminates in devotion to the Emperor as father of his people.

When I came to Japan as a youthful teacher in 1892, servants could still be found that were religiously loyal to their masters, even though these were foreigners. An instance of this unquestioning loyalty that would have been touching had it not been so amusing occurred immediately after I set

up my bachelor establishment in a little bungalow in Tsukiji, here in Tokyo. In those days of ex-territoriality practically all the Tokyo foreigners resided in Tsukiji, so I bought some second-hand furniture and engaged as my one servant a bewhiskered little man of fifty whom everybody called Toku San. He understood no word of English and I no word of Japanese, but he was a good cook and dish-washer. I tried to use him as valet, for I had read in Sir Edwin Arnold's amazingly misleading "*Japonica*" that a Japanese servant could do absolutely anything, and I particularly abhorred shaving. So on our first Sunday morning I took my trick dictionary-holder, brought all the way from America, and with it at the back of a chair extemporized a fair imitation of a barber's chair. Then I seized my new dictionary (it was Hepburn's unabridged) and looked up the word for "shave." There it was: *Soru*, *Soru*, *Soru*, as I said it over and over again to myself, there being no one to tell me that it might mean: "I shave," "Thou shavest," "He, She, or It shaves," "We shave," "You shave," "They shave." At last I called Toku San in, and, assuming an attitude of command, ejaculated:

“Soru!”

Toku San shook his head in dismay as he rapidly answered, “*Wakarimasen!*”—which, being interpreted, meant, “I humbly do not understand.”

I understood just enough to understand that, but I was bent upon using my valet, as I had never had one before. So I assumed a somewhat sterner aspect, and shouted in a tone that could not be ignored the only word I knew upon the subject:

“Soru!”

Toku San, anxious to please, was now obviously discomfited. “Mr. Master, I do not understand a little bit,” he said in his politest Japanese.

Still one more effort I made with my sole but steadfast word, accompanying it this time, however, with a sweeping tonsorial gesture across my callow countenance. This time, Toku San understood! With glad and hasty step he retired into the adjoining room to make the grave and necessary preparations. Meanwhile I became lost in the labyrinths of my dictionary, and did not look up for some minutes. When I did, the devoted Toku San was standing before my mirror, my own particular shaving-brush in

one hand, my razor wobbling wildly in the other, his crinkled face creamy with imported lather, about to offer the supreme sacrifice of his tenderly nourished whiskers on the altar of loyalty.

After a year in Tokyo studying the language I went down to Saga to teach in the Government Middle School for four years, and Toku San went with me. While there I married another American teacher, who lived in Yamaguchi, and Toku San became devoted to both of us, and to our little Daughter when she arrived. I think he would have laid down his life for any of us.

In November, 1932, shortly after arriving in Japan for this present visit, the *moshi-moshi* girl at the Imperial Hotel 'phoned up to my room that Mr. Oguchi was downstairs waiting to see me. I told her that I didn't know any Mr. Oguchi. "Oh, yes," she expostulated, "he knew you when you lived here many years ago! He knew you very well indeed!" "Well, I don't remember any Mr. Oguchi, but I'll come down," I answered.

When I saw who my guest really was I fell upon his neck like the man in the Bible. I hadn't known Toku San as Mr. Oguchi,

but here he was in the flesh, so unchanged after almost forty years that I recognized him instantly. He had seen in the *Asahi* newspaper the picture of my former pupil, General Masaki, and myself that appears on the jacket of this volume, and, although ninety years old, had got a kind neighbor to pilot him from his suburban home down to the hotel to greet me. Almost his first words, broken by laughter, were these — “Please notice that I haven’t any whiskers! I haven’t worn any from that day to this!”

My reply, I think, was also broken, but not altogether by laughter.

Saga, forty years ago, was strong on *Yamato Damashii*, a phrase that I heard rather often. The war with China was fought while I taught there, and my pupils sometimes manifested an intense nationalism. I remember the essay one of them wrote when I assigned as the subject, “Why I Study English.” His conclusion, which was thoroughly logical, ran somewhat after this fashion:

“Language is the chief human means of understanding one another. But there are many languages. If we Japanese wish to understand other peoples we must study

language. It seems to us that England and America are the two strongest peoples. So we study English. In this way we shall learn the secret of England's and America's strength. After we have done that we shall sail through the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea and conquer England. Then we shall sail across the Atlantic Ocean and conquer our dear teacher's country, and the flag of Great Japan will wave above all the world."

I renewed acquaintance with the writer of that essay one Sunday when my old Saga boys now living in Tokyo gave me a reception at the Suikōsha, and we had a good laugh together over why he had studied English.

The war with China germinated an equally intense nationalism over there. When in Shanghai recently I came across a poem composed in his youth by the scholar K'ang Yu-wei that almost exactly parallels the conclusion of the student in Saga, a poem occasioned by the war with Japan:

Let us hasten to develop our industry and
steam-engines,

We may draw our resources from Europe
and America;

We have four or five hundred millions of
people,
Out of whom we may enlist ten millions
soldiers;
We have iron and metals in limitless
quantity,
With them we could build thousands of
war-ships;
Then we shall stride across the Five Con-
tinents
Where you will see the Yellow Dragon
banners fly and dance!

Intense nationalism, therefore, is not a sentiment peculiar to *Yamato Damashii*. If the world has come to dread the nationalism of Japan it is because the energy and coherence of her people have extended her Empire amazingly since my student wrote his essay, while the Empire of China has dissolved into a nightmare republic that cannot hold what it claims is its own. However, as a wise Chinese writer has said, K'ang Yu-wei's poem was "imperialism, naked and unconditioned," and it was fortunate for China as well as for the rest of the world that she did not succeed in bringing the dream of her poet-scholar to realization.

Yamato Damashii as I knew it in Saga

forty years ago was slightly tainted with anti-foreignism. Although on the whole I was treated with remarkable courtesy, the word *ketō-jin* was sometimes heard on the streets, the less offensive *ijin* was in common use, and once in a while I was stoned. The only instance of anti-foreignism that I remember among the students themselves was the funniest experience of my life.

One of the boys was so mischievous that he was always required to sit in the front row. One day when I was standing at the far end of the platform I noticed that he was using his Japanese *fude*, or brush-pen, to write down something in English, at which his desk-mate was smiling. Tip-toeing to the edge of the platform just over the desk, I could look down and read, upside down, what had just been written. At this point it ought to be explained that my eyes are blue, which in the Japanese language is green, and that my now gray hair was then a sort of brindle, which in the Japanese language is red, and that green eyes and red hair are the distinctive attributes of Japanese devils. The student had written:

“The foreigner has green eyes and red hair, and—” when his desk-mate nudged him.

Of course he was going to add, "and looks like the devil;" but without looking up or moving a muscle he completed the sentence with such a glaring *non sequitur* that I was quite overcome with mirth—"and is very beautiful!"

The thing was so funny that I wrote it on the blackboard for all the students to laugh at, but they took it as no laughing matter that one of their number should manifest even a humorous anti-foreignism toward their teacher of English.

There is not much anti-foreignism discernible in Japan today, but it seems as widespread and deep-seated in China as ever. Not long ago I had a letter from a fellow-countryman long resident in northern China who wrote that his wife was coming back from America and that he was coming to Japan to meet her "and bring her the rest of the way, for China is a difficult country to get into at best, and unless one docks in some foreign-controlled port the people seem to make it as difficult as possible for the new arrival."

When will Americans understand that *all* foreigners are hated in China, not merely the Japanese, and that this hatred is systematically perpetuated by being taught in

the schools? "Coddling China has become an American habit," as George Sokolsky says, and some of our people seem to prefer propaganda to facts.

I am not presuming to explore the depths of "Japanese spirit," I am only giving some of its aspects as they appeared to a young American a generation ago.

Its most impressive aspect was, naturally, the admiration of a code of behavior that to me was novel and strange. Always this code of behavior seemed to stress loyalty. During the war with China I gave to my students as the subject for an essay, "The Noblest Deed I Ever Heard Of." Every man in the class but one wrote of the suicide of Admiral Ting! His fleet had been surrounded by the Japanese navy, and surrender was inevitable; but to his mind the surrender of his own person would have been an act of disloyalty to his master the Emperor of China, so, like Major Koga at Shanghai many years afterward, he committed suicide to escape the dishonor of being made prisoner.

The Japanese held to the same moral code as the Chinese. Even though an enemy, Admiral Ting seemed to my Saga boys to have done the noblest deed they had ever

heard of. However, the point should not be stressed, as the memory of school-boys is short, and Japanese history abounds in instances of loyalty just as impressive as that of the Chinese Admiral, including the classic instance of the Forty-Seven Rōnin. I find, by the way, that no plays in the great modern theaters here in Tokyo draw fuller houses or louder applause than this play and the drama of Benkei's loyalty to his master Yoshitsune.

The quintessence of such loyalty has always seemed to me to be expressed in the ancient custom of *junshi*, or "follow-death," leading the vassals of a deceased lord to follow him into the world of shadows. The greatest of the Shōguns, Iyeyasu, endeavored to abolish *junshi*, as a life devoted to the living rather than death for the dead seemed to him preferable, while one of his successors interdicted this kind of suicide with the threatened visitation of the most terrific penalties on all surviving members of the family. "Not until the exaction of these terrible penalties did the custom receive its death-blow," wrote Brinkley the historian about 1900.

But *junshi* had not even then received its

death-blow; it came to life impressively a dozen years after Captain Brinkley penned its obituary. For when the great Emperor Meiji died, in 1912, General Nogi committed the follow-death, together with his wife. So far from being regarded as disgraced for this sacrificial act, General Nogi and his wife were honored in an extraordinary manner. Visitors to Peachtree Hill in the suburbs of Kyoto not only marvel today at the immense Meiji mausoleum standing where Hideyoshi's palace of pleasure once stood, but pause at its base to marvel again before the shrines of General and Mrs. Nogi, entombed near their Emperor and Empress, and worshiped because of their self-immolation.

I find that the old phrase, *Yamato Damashii*, has now been almost displaced by the new phrase, *Nippon Seishin*. While I do not relish being regarded as a *rikutsu-poi*, or pedant, it is difficult to resist the temptation of throwing this difference, as a bone of discussion, into a group of Japanese friends gathered at some informal feast. When entertained by General Tashiro, another Saga man, at Shanghai, a lively debate ensued. Some of the officers thought that no difference whatever was denoted by the change

of phrase, but the majority opinion seemed to be that *Nippon Seishin* is *Yamato Damashii* plus.

While I hesitate to intrude my own opinion, I will venture to say that to my own mind *Nippon* strikes the modern and practical note in contrast with the ancient poesy clustered about the name of *Yamato*, while *Seishin* seems to suggest "mind" and "will" rather than a mystical "soul." I wonder, therefore, whether the unintended and unremarked change of phrase is not just a reflection of the modern and practical phase into which Japanese life has entered. Much more interesting is the suggestion, which I now get from every quarter, that the new name is the old thing *plus*.

From conversations with thoughtful men and women I take this to mean that Japan, while resolved to retain her old spirit, is equally resolved to add thereto sundry borrowings from the rest of the world. Japan is nothing if not catholic. One of the charms of Tokyo is the blend of the old and new. Sometimes the new will not blend with the old, as in the case of sex movies, dance halls, and lounge lizards. The result is a clangorous discord. But when a genuine blend is

attained, the unexpected harmony is effective from its very novelty.

To me one of the most interesting shrines in Tokyo is one of the smallest and newest. It is on the site of an old fish market, almost within the shadow of Tokyo's largest department store. Anjin is the name of the street, so called (if I am correctly informed) because Will Adams once lived there, and Anjin Miura was the Japanese name of this burly English pilot who hobnobbed with the icy Iyeyasu and drew from that ideal prince of Macchiavelli the only expressions of affection of which we have any record. On the right side of the entrance to the little temple there is a modest monument to the Elizabethan sailor, but the temple itself commemorates in a singularly Japanese fashion a pretty incident in the life of an American.

The shrine, which was dedicated in 1930, bears the name of the Black Ship Okichi Fudō. The first part of this title refers to the "four black ships of evil mien" with which Commodore Perry forced the locked harbors of Japan. Okichi is said to have been the name of the little Japanese maid who ministered to the needs of Townsend Harris during the long and lonely months he

lived at Shimoda, laying those foundations of Japanese-American friendship that must never be destroyed. Fudō is a Buddhist deity with the power of exorcising devils, and this particular Fudō was carried down to Shimoda from Yedo by a devout Buddhist during the days when the fate of the new treaty hung in the balance. His name was Shinjiro Isa, a minor representative of the Tokugawa Shōgun, so deeply desirous of the treaty's success that he prayed to his Fudō day and night to cast out the devils of mistrust and suspicion that militated against it. During the negotiations Mr. Harris fell ill of a fever. Faithful little Okichi, distressed for her master, then stole to the sacred image twice a day and implored Fudō to cast out the fever devil. Mr. Harris got well, and the treaty was signed. Mr. Isa was so grateful to his Fudō that when he retired to his rural home near Shizuoka he not only set it up there but kept candles constantly lighted before it, so that it became known as the Perpetually Lighted Fudō, the *Kesazu-no-Fudō*. Now it stands here in the street of Will Adams as a perpetual memorial to Townsend Harris and the little maid whose devotion never flickered.

If this is *Nippon Seishin*, let us have more of it.

It must be confessed, however, that the outside world is somewhat disturbed by what it hears about *Nippon Seishin*. Sentiments like those of my Saga school-boy have been bruited abroad. The world remembers "Deutschland über Alles," and wonders whether Japan also entertains an ambition to have her flag wave above a considerable portion of the globe. The world remembers that when my school-boy wrote his essay Formosa had not become Taiwan, nor Korea Chōsen, nor Manchuria Manchoukuo. It wonders whether Japan's desire for a place in the sun is satisfied, whether *Nippon Seishin* is to become another *Kultur*. Personally, I believe that Japan is sincere when she says that she has no designs on China proper, and that she desires the actual independence of Manchoukuo. Otherwise I should not have written this book. But to convince the whole world of this is a different matter. Everything depends on the meaning of that little word *plus*. Somehow we must manage to fill it with the radiant ideals of peace.

IX

JAPANESE-AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTER-DEPENDENCE

*“We are more afraid of an American boycott
than of almost anything else!”*

WHEN one of my intimate friends, a Tokyo business man, said this, I replied with two facts: that an international boycott is repugnant to the American mind, and that America herself would suffer from a cessation of trade with Japan. I then invited my friend to attend a lecture I was to give at the Imperial University under the title that heads this chapter. He did not come, so I am going to print here what I said there, and send him a copy of this book!

As a traveler I find Pacific steamships and motor-ships more interesting than those on the Atlantic. I am not speaking of the vessels themselves, but of their human cargoes. The passengers on a trans-Pacific vessel, besides being engagingly diversified, are not predominantly mere pleasure-seekers. They are as a rule thoughtful people, worth talking with; people of wide interests; people

who know where and why they are going, and that they are on their way.

If one could uncover the hatches and explore the holds of one of these trans-Pacific ships, one would find an equally diversified and an equally colorful cargo. East-bound, a Japanese vessel — such as the magnificent motor-ships of the Nippon Yusen Kwaisha — carries a variety of purely Japanese products, from a few pounds of Pyrethrum flowers to hundreds of bales of raw silk. West-bound, she brings a little of everything, from cinema films to cotton.

Everybody knows that raw silk and raw cotton are the two major items in this incessant economic exchange. Perhaps they are the only items that really denote economic inter-dependence. Except for Japan's raw silk, American silk mills would probably have to shut down. Except for America's raw cotton, Japan would have to fall back on the inferior product of India.

Not only do our two countries depend on each other for these two important commodities, they exchange them in such quantities that if commerce in them were shut off the national revenues would be seriously diminished. During 1931 the United States

actually took 96 per cent of Japan's raw silk, which represents 30 per cent of the total exports. It is easy to see how the finances of Japan would suffer were this source of revenue closed. But the dependence is not on Japan's side alone. According to Bradstreet, during the last quarter of 1931 Japan took more than 777,000 bales of cotton from the United States, constituting nearly a quarter of the total American exports, surprising as that fact may seem. Japan's cotton purchases at that time were so important to Uncle Sam that he made grateful note of them in one of his bulletins. "If American exports to Japan were laid under an embargo," says a recent writer, "it is no exaggeration to say that it would deal a fatal blow to cotton farming, and might easily undermine the whole economic structure of the United States."

Japan, in turn, depends to an extraordinary degree for her national welfare on a plentiful supply of good cotton; which, for reasons inherent in the peculiar nature of the plant, can be better produced in America than anywhere else.

To explain. Japan, for better or worse, has become an industrial nation. Her very

existence is now bound up with that fact. A peculiar feature of the case is this: she can live only by marketing, in one foreign country or another, goods manufactured by her out of raw materials obtained from some other foreign country. In the instance in question, she obtains from the United States raw cotton, which she runs through her mills, and then markets on the mainland of Asia. Were this international machinery of national support shut down, it is difficult to see what would become of Japan.

We can now see why my friend and others like him are so distressed at the thought of a possible American boycott; for not only cotton and silk, but many other important commodities, enter the picture.

Perhaps this makes out the case for Japanese-American economic inter-dependence. Since cotton is the chief commodity concerned, I wish to show — for a special reason — the dramatic rôle played by this fascinating plant in the weaving of American history.

It is known only to rather close students of that history that the first laws against slavery were passed in the South. Virginia enacted such a law in 1778, in the very first

session of her legislature under the republican form of government, as Thomas Jefferson boasted. Not only Jefferson, but Washington, Madison, Monroe, and Patrick Henry were all outspoken against slavery. Maryland followed Virginia's legislative example in 1783, North Carolina in 1786, Georgia in 1798. Not only so, but when Congress organized the Northwest Territory in 1787 it included in the bill an ordinance against slavery in all that vast territory, and this ordinance received the unanimous support of the Southern states.

But in 1793 something happened. A man invented a machine.

Eli Whitney, a young Yankee schoolmaster who went to Georgia from Yale, did as much to direct the course of American history as any man after George Washington. Almost by accident, almost against his will, he permitted himself to be persuaded by the Southern lady who employed him as a tutor for her children to set his mind to work on a device for separating the lint of the stubborn "wild" cotton of the uplands from the seeds to which it clung so tenaciously, and succeeded. Down to the hour of Whitney's success the cotton supply of the

States had been limited to the long staple variety, which grew only on a few sea islands. His invention made the short staple cotton of the uplands a vast source of new wealth. No sooner had Whitney invented his gin than the South like magic abandoned manufactures and became a huge plantation, while New England contributed its ships to the revived slave trade with Africa. Farmers in the Northern states were now able to sell their slaves, who had become an expensive burden to them, to the new cotton planters of the South. New York and Georgia, which in 1790 had an almost equal number of slaves, by 1810 showed an enormous divergence: only 15,000 in New York, but 105,000 in Georgia. The Southern states repealed the laws they had so recently enacted against slavery, just as the Northern states would have done had a new source of wealth suddenly dropped into their hands dependent upon a cheap and plentiful labor supply. At any rate, from this time forth slavery seemed nothing less than the indispensable economic instrument of Southern society.

The North, being unable to grow cotton, turned to its manufacture. Prior to Whitney's invention, the South had led the Union in

manufactures. It now devoted itself to agriculture, and to a single crop at that, cotton being so lucrative; while the North lined its streams with mills to turn this new crop into cloth.

If one wonders at the amazing influence of cotton on the past and present history of the world, one needs but remember that man has only three fundamental requirements: food, shelter, and raiment; and that the sources of food and shelter are many, whereas the cotton plant enjoys a practical monopoly of the raiment supply. When Whitney invented the gin wool constituted 77.2 per cent of the raiment of Europeans and Americans, and cotton only 4.4 per cent; but, according to Mr. Sanji Muto, cotton now constitutes nine-tenths of the world's clothing.

In its influence on United States history it not only changed slavery conditions, but it became inextricably interwoven with the expansion of the young republic. The push toward the West was economic. The main force behind this push was the South. It desired additional cotton lands, and as slavery furnished the essential labor supply, Congress soon became an angry debating club, wran-

gling over the question of slavery in the newly acquired territory. Moral heat intensified the friction, and two great sections emerged.

Meanwhile the population of the North was growing much faster than that of the South, as European immigrants did not care to mingle with slaves, and the manufacturing cities of the North offered them employment. The South saw with dismay that its power in Congress was waning. Anxious to dictate its policies in its own interests, it soon became the champion of States' Rights, while the North favored centralization. As the increasing divergency of population gave the North more and more power to embarrass the South in Congress, the South finally translated the doctrine of States' Rights into terms of Secession. Secession had once been a doctrine quite as prevalent in the North as in the South, but after 1828 it became the rallying cry of Southern extremists.

The year 1828 should be noted.

In no respect except Slavery itself does the influence of cotton stand out so clearly in American history as in respect of the growth of the Tariff. Before Whitney's invention the South, a manufacturing section, stood for Protection, while New England

championed Free Trade. Daniel Webster and John C. Calhoun entered Congress about the same time, Webster as the spokesman of Free Trade, Calhoun of Protection. As everybody knows, during the Congressional debates that ensued they changed shoes. Due to the influence of King Cotton, agricultural in the South but industrial in the North, Calhoun became champion of the cause he had formerly opposed, Free Trade, while Webster expended his eloquence for Protection. Each of them simply swung true to the changed economic interests of their constituencies. In the interests of its manufactures, which clustered around cotton manufacture, the North raised the Tariff higher and higher, until, in 1828, the so-called "Tariff of Abominations" so injured the South that it began openly to consider Nullification and Secession.

I have sketched the course of events with utmost brevity, but I assure those that have not studied the subject that the closer one's scrutiny the clearer becomes one's conviction that the influence of the cotton plant was the prime cause in dividing the States of the North American Union into two opposed camps, their political interests divergent because of the clash of economic interests.

Cotton made the South a Free Trade section and the North Protective, Northern policy culminating in the Tariff of Abominations. Cotton lured the South back to slavery. Cotton drove the South to seek the annexation of new lands for its abundant production, and to insist on the maintenance of slave labor on those lands in order to produce it. Cotton drove the South to an extreme States' Rights position in those great Congressional struggles in which the efforts for territorial expansion were involved. And cotton at last drove the South to translate States' Rights into terms of Secession, while the North step by step lined up on the opposite side of these issues, which at first had not been sectional at all. The result was the Civil War.

Cotton today is the chief export crop of the United States, exceeding in value the next three greatest export groups combined. The world's cotton crop, of which about three-quarters is produced in the United States, exceeds in value the world's output of the precious metals by fifty per cent. In normal years it is this single commodity that maintains a balance of trade in favor of the United States on the pages of the world's ledgers. Yet only one acre in seventeen of

lands available for cotton production is planted to that crop. One of the chief objects of the United States Department of Agriculture is to hold the supply of American cotton down to the world's demand.

About ten years before the Civil War broke out, while cotton was still king, Southern statesmen in Congress foresaw the potentialities of China for the extension of King Cotton's sway. With that object in view they planned trans-continental railways and trans-Pacific steamship companies. A Georgia representative, T. Butler King, expounded these ambitious enterprises. This was the starting-point of the movement which culminated in the dispatch of Commodore Perry's squadron to the Far East.

The Civil War broke the political power of the South, and retarded the Westward push of the cotton trade; but now the undivided United States turns with interest toward China as an ever-expanding market for its resources, including cotton. When Wu Ting Fang represented China in Washington he attracted wide interest by a witty speech in which he said that if every Chinese could be persuaded to add one inch to the tail of his shirt, 2,000,000 cotton bales would be required

to meet the demand. That speech was made thirty-two years ago, and during that time the Chinese have seemed to accept Mr. Wu's challenge, by demanding more clothes; so that the consumption of their cotton mills has quadrupled.

So much for the interest of the United States in the Orient as a cotton market. Now let us hear from Japan.

Writing in *Contemporary Japan* for September, 1932, Mr. Sanji Muto says:—

It is estimated that of the world's population 500,000,000 are completely clothed, 750,000,000 partially clothed, and 250,000,000 not clothed at all; and it is calculated that the cotton industry supplies nine-tenths of the clothing now worn. These are indeed significant facts for the cotton industry as a whole, and they have an added significance for Japan in that the vast majority of those populations which will constitute the cotton demand of the future lie close to the overseas markets which our industry has already established.

It now becomes evident that the economic inter-dependence of Japan and the United States with regard to cotton is not as simple as at first appeared. It is complicated by the fact that the United States not only produces the raw material but also

weaves it into clothing. Therefore the two countries are not merely partners in the handling of this giant commodity. They may become dangerous rivals.

Drift, instead of a policy of mastery, led to the American Civil War. Its economic cause has only recently become apparent. The slender thread of cotton, weaving its inexorable web of war, was obscured by the political thunder-storms that preceded the great calamity. Had the thread been disentangled, the fatal pattern discerned, and a policy of intelligent mastery substituted for one of drift, the calamity might have been averted.

I have singled out cotton as one of the gigantic commodities in which Japan and the United States have joint interests. The causes of most modern wars are economic. It is high time to apply lessons learned from the past. Wise foresight can prevent wars by dealing with their causes. Economic co-operation, instead of cut-throat competition, is the surest preventive of war. It is perfectly feasible. It requires only clear and patient thought.

Shaka declared that the three chief sources of evil are sensuality, ill will, and stupidity.

He might have added, “and the greatest of these is stupidity.”

PREPAREDNESS FOR PEACE IN THE PACIFIC: THREE AMERICANS SPEAK

"Can we keep the Pacific true to its name?"

THAT is my own confession ; a confession of doubt. I have asked it of myself a good many times throughout the years since I first came to Japan, and now the only answer I feel sure of is this : that peace in the Pacific can be maintained only by careful and patient planning. It will not come by accident. This is equivalent to what was said in the last chapter with reference to economic conditions. But economic conditions are not the only ones that affect international relations. Even such an intangible thing as idealism has to be taken into account. Just at this moment the idealism of the American people is something that has to be reckoned with, decidedly. Ambassador Grew is so conscious of this that he almost went out of his way to talk about it in a speech at Osaka. He gives me permission to quote him.

I should like to touch very briefly on a subject which intimately concerns us all, every one of us,

and Japan quite as much as the United States. In some respects this old world of ours plods along pretty slowly. We achieve amazing progress in some directions—progress in communication and transportation, in mechanical and electrical inventions, in medicine and architecture and education, in agriculture and commerce, and in a thousand other ways. Almost incredible advancement in these matters takes place from year to year, from decade to decade and from century to century. In another province of world interest—a province which, as I have said, intimately concerns every one of us—advancement has been less rapid, less sensational, perhaps, and yet ultimate success is just as inevitable, just as certain.

I have in mind the attainment of permanent and inviolable world peace. That process has gone forward step by step. It may at times have seemed discouragingly slow. It may at times have suffered disheartening interruptions. But what seemed to us a slow and halting advancement was only so by comparison with the more rapid and sensational headway in other lines of human endeavor.

Consider all that has been done since the first Hague Conference of 1899, little more than a quarter of a century ago. If that conference and many ensuing ones failed to accomplish all that we hoped and desired, they at least set men's minds thinking in a new and saner channel, along new and enlightened lines. Each in itself was a forward

step. The Great War was a fearful interruption, and yet the Great War gave an impetus to the movement which is steadily bearing fruit as never before. It resulted in a determination that those dark days of 1914 to 1918 should never be repeated. It resulted in innumerable treaties of arbitration and conciliation between individual nations, in multilateral treaties aimed to insure peace between groups of nations, it resulted in the various disarmament conferences, in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the World Court, and above all it resulted in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, definitely outlawing war.

These, then, are the concrete results of the determined desire of man to achieve permanent and inviolate peace by substituting for individual interest the greater good of the greater number.

As for the American people, they are heart and soul behind this movement and behind those who have labored to bring about a situation where warfare between civilized nations will be as extinct as human slavery in civilized nations is today. This peace movement represents a fundamental, united and unanimous desire of the American people. Slavery, from time immemorial, was an accepted principle of human conduct. Finally civilization and humanity rebelled. It was abolished. Organized warfare, from time immemorial, was an accepted principle of human conduct. Again mankind rebelled. By the almost universally accepted Kellogg Pact, now adhered to by

sixty-two nations, war was renounced as an instrument of national policy. . . .

As for the ways and means of working out the various problems involved in this world movement, differences of opinion between nations inevitably arise. There can be no more important duty for statesmanship and diplomacy today than to smooth out and align these differences of opinion. For my part, I count it the greatest privilege of my life to represent my country in Japan and to try to contribute, however modestly, to this absolutely essential alignment. I haven't a doubt that with mutual patience and good will we shall eventually arrive at a happy adjustment of our respective points of view. I look forward confidently to increased co-operation between our two nations to bring about this great work of civilization. There is in the United States a fundamental friendship and friendliness for Japan and the Japanese people. That fact should never be forgotten.

Seldom has the idealism of the people of the United States been so worthily represented. Seldom have the diplomatic instruments tending toward peace been more strongly or more tactfully defended. And yet the fact remains that the situation in which Japan finds herself is not adequately served by these instruments. Another Amer-

ican, Mr. Jerome D. Greene, already quoted, sets this fact forth. His key passage I print in italics.

Closely identified with Japan's economic interest in Manchuria (says Mr. Greene) is her strategic interest in that area as a possible base of military operations hostile to the independence and survival of Japan. The Japanese people will never forget what it cost them in blood and treasure to resist the Russian menace of 1904-05. To them that menace is not an academic theory such as General Staffs and War Colleges like to play with as an intellectual discipline for military experts. It is a living terror made only more real after the Russo-Japanese War by the discovery that their country was then so nearly at the end of its resources. Manchuria, they say, cannot be allowed either to harbor a hostile Power or to be in a state of anarchy such as to invite violation of its territory by such a Power. *This is perhaps the most striking example in the world today of a realistic factor which the formal mechanisms for the preservation of peace have not taken fully into account.* The subordination of law to public opinion and feeling, of which examples are not wanting in other fields of legislation, is never more clear or imperative than where the literal application of international law and treaties is thought, whether rightly or wrongly, to be incompatible with the natural law of self-preservation. Whether this is a justifiable attitude or not, it is a real one, and has to be taken into

account as part of the objective background of Sino-Japanese relations.

These words of Mr. Greene recall the words with which this book opens. They were spoken by General Araki. Speaking of Japan's invasion of Manchuria, he asked me — "What else could we do for our own defense and self-preservation?" I had no answer for him then, and I have no answer now. There is no doubt that in asking this question he is absolutely sincere, and that he represents the entire Japanese people. I myself think that he does not exaggerate the menace from Russia.

This chapter, however, is composed of contributions from others. A third American will close it. He was technical adviser to the Lytton Commission, his services being engaged because of his ability to see things objectively. He is now Far Eastern representative of the Institute of Current World Affairs of New York, his name being Dr. C. Walter Young. The title of this chapter was the subject an address he made during February, 1933, before the America-Japan Society of Tokyo.

During the first part of his address Dr. Young pointed out that Geneva is concerned

not only with the liquidation of the Manchurian dispute, but also with the vindication of those instruments tending toward peace so ably defended by Ambassador Grew: the Pact of Paris, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Covenant of the League itself. European powers, as he said, are particularly concerned with the problem of psychological insecurity which cannot be dissociated from the present League action in dealing with Manchuria. It is therefore imperative to bear in mind that the activities at Geneva are motivated not by any desire to censure either of the parties to the dispute, but rather by the wish to bring the dispute into line with the League Covenant. The problem of the present is to deal with the League phase; that of the future is to harmonize the respective interests of Japan and China in Manchuria. Dr. Young then offered constructive suggestions of high value, as follows:

There is a large problem which the League of Nations has not yet begun to handle and, in the minds of many, is incompetent to deal with single-handedly. I refer to the problem of preparedness for peace in the entire area of the Pacific, and Eastern Asia. We are unprepared for peace in the

Pacific area. We are less prepared than we were on the eve of the Washington Conference. Not alone the Manchurian dispute between Japan and China, but the great problem of assisting China in her stupendous task of political and economic rehabilitation, and the problem of providing security in the entire region of the Pacific and Eastern Asia,—these demonstrate that if we are to maintain peace in the Pacific, founded on security, political, economic, and psychological, we must begin now to make preparations for it. The Manchurian dispute has tended both to emphasize and to obscure this larger problem. And no attempt at a solution of the Manchurian dispute can have hope of reasonable success unless it is fitted into that larger framework. Emphatically, we need to become Pacific-minded.

The Japanese Government has placed emphasis upon the deficiencies which, since the Washington Conference, have worked against political order, and security for the lives and interests of foreigners, in China. So also did the Lytton Report; recommending a programme of international co-operation in the reconstruction of China. Presumably, therefore, it should not be difficult to find general agreement among the Powers having interests in China as to some concrete and positive programme for offering such assistance. The fact is, however, that neither Japan, nor Great Britain, nor the United States, for example, has made any such concrete proposal; and this important subject,

in my opinion, has not been given the attention it deserves in Geneva. Nor has China taken the initiative by inviting such co-operation, except in so far as League experts and advisers have occasionally been invited to assist the National Government.

Without minimizing the able work of some of the League advisers in China, it must seem obvious that the problems involved in this task of assisting China in her political and economic rehabilitation are so vast and so complex that no programme, characterized simply by the presence of occasional League experts in China, can deal adequately with the situation. What is needed, first, is full and frank agreement especially among Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, that such a programme shall be worked out co-operatively; second, that there should be a definite determination to re-orientate their respective policies toward China with that object in view; and finally, that such co-operation and assistance to China should be given on the invitation of the Chinese Government, should be reconcilable with Chinese sovereignty, and should be regarded as a temporary expedient.

The progress, or lack of progress, which China has made toward political unification, economic rehabilitation, and establishment of reasonable protection for the lives and vested interests of foreigners has unfortunately fallen far short of the expectations which were expressed in the Nine-Power Treaty. On the other hand, it is equally

obvious that the signatories of that treaty have made very little effort to implement the pledges then made by providing positive assistance for China in her herculean task of internal rehabilitation. There has been much patience, but no positive programme.

The test of devotion to the expressed desire to see China strengthened in her internal political organization is to be found in the willingness of the Powers to co-operate to make such a condition possible. Moreover, it is premature to assume that the Chinese people would not welcome such co-operation. A concrete programme would first have to be worked out in detail, in conjunction with the recognized Government of China. I confess I am skeptical about the possibility of perfecting such a programme unless it were preceded by a re-orientation of the diplomatic policy of the Great Powers, especially Japan, Great Britain, and the United States. And I have misgivings whether such re-orientation is at all possible unless these Powers, with others, meet in conference for the purpose.

We will not be prepared for peace in the Pacific and Eastern Asia, however, until we have turned ourselves to the task of substituting security, political, economic, and psychological, for the present state of insecurity. Compared with other regions of the world, the international organization of the Pacific Region is primitive. There exist, of course, the Covenant of the League,

the Pact of Paris, the Nine-Power Treaty, the Four-Power Treaty of the Pacific, and various agreements on armament limitation.

I need not labor the argument that the League Covenant is inadequate to this situation, especially as the United States and the Soviet Union are not members of the League. There are loopholes in the Pact of Paris. The Nine-Power Treaty has been interpreted largely as a self-denying ordinance, and the Japanese Government has taken the position that conditions in China since the signing of that treaty have qualified its application, contending also that it has no application at all to the present situation in Manchuria.

The Four-Power Treaty—the only strictly regional security agreement applicable to the Pacific Area—was limited in its scope and effectiveness to questions relating to insular possessions and dependencies in the Pacific. It has never been invoked, and its value falls far short of constituting an effective security pact for the Pacific Area. Moreover, the United States has raised the question whether, if the Nine-Power Treaty be regarded as inapplicable to the Manchurian dispute, there remains the obligation to interpret the Four-Power Treaty unqualifiedly as in the past. Finally, no bilateral pacts of non-aggression exist having special application to Japan, China, the Soviet Union, or the United States in the Pacific and Eastern Asia. Nor does any general treaty of arbitration or conciliation exist between Japan and China.

These are some of the circumstances which point to the conclusion that the countries concerned have thus far failed to prepare for peace either in the Pacific Area generally, or in Eastern Asia and Manchuria in particular. Can it be reasonably argued that the problems of security and disarmament, so interwoven in Europe, are less related to the region of the Pacific and Eastern Asia? Might there not be wisdom in Japan, Great Britain, and the United States taking the initiative in preparing negotiations, or perhaps in convening a conference, to deal with this problem of security, recognizing that the agenda should include both political and economic categories?

I have sought to direct your attention to this larger problem of the Pacific and Eastern Asia which so far has been given but little attention in Geneva. Comparing the situation today with that which preceded the Washington Conference, it appears no less filled with unfortunate possibilities for the future. The Washington Conference solution, whatever may have been its original utility, is patently inadequate to the present situation, if for no other reason than that the Soviet Union has subsequently been recognized by both Japan and China, and no multilateral solution of the problems of the Pacific and Eastern Asia today can be satisfactory which fails to take account of the position of Soviet Russia.

Permit me to conclude this all too sketchy attempt to stimulate thought on problems which

are germane to the Manchurian dispute itself by recalling again the immediate aftermath of the Washington Conference. Is it possible again to tap those springs of good will in such a way as to intensify mutual understanding and confidence, particularly between Japan and the United States? I have but recently returned from America, and feel sure that many of my Japanese friends would be surprised to know how much of that precious commodity—Good Will—lies latent there for the welfare of Japan and the Japanese people. I found such expressions of good will even in quarters which were quite frankly critical of certain of Japan's policies.

THE GREATEST JAPANESE

“I am not interested in anything old!”

ALL of us have heard many times that the West represents action, the East the reverse. But anybody who crosses the Pacific seeking the life of passive contemplation is slated for surprise, unless indeed he keeps on to India. On this my latest visit to Japan I landed in Tokyo a few days before the American Thanksgiving Day. On Thanksgiving eve I strolled out to find what Mr. Percival Lowell wrote about as the Soul of the East. He found it, I think, on the Ginza. Instead of the Soul of the East I found an American turkey dinner; instead of a “soul-calming festival” I found a carnival. Every night there is a carnival on The Ginza. The lights were so bright on Thanksgiving eve that I read one of Mr. Matsuoka’s speeches standing on a street corner. Instead of peaceful Shintō music my ears were assailed by clanging tramcars and honking motorcars, while over and through all the penetrating radio voice of Mr. Lefty O’doul

shouted into the ears of the hurrying multitudes the esoterics of American baseball.

I am not complaining of all this, I am only commenting on it. Somebody has said that vitality is the most charming thing in the world. If that be true, the Ginza is quite as charming as Broadway. I doubt whether the Japanese have ever been a quiet and contemplative people, any more than the Americans. Endowed with super-abundant energy, frequent earthquakes have forced them to "step lively," accelerating their in-born speed. The greatest Japanese himself was incarnate energy. As I invite the reader to think of him with me for a while it is not in the foolish presumption that I can add anything original to his well-known personal history; I merely desire to pay my sincere tribute to one of the greatest men of all places and all time, especially in view of the contempt which some young Japanese seem to feel for the past.

"Let the dead past bury its dead," yes; but much of the past still lives, and there are certain "dead but scept'red sovereigns who rule us from their urns." Prince Shōtoku is one of these.

His works were of a sovereign splendor.

Some of them still remain to vouch for him. In the village of Hōryūji, a few miles from Nara, one may still see three of the buildings which the greatest Japanese dedicated to Shaka in the year 616 A.D., a thousand years to the year before Shakespeare died. Japan had her Elizabethan Age a millennium before England's, and it is named after a woman, the Empress Suiko; although it was her nephew, the Regent of whom I am writing, that made her age so brilliant. Down to his time the Japanese had lived an exceedingly primitive life, with a rude primitive culture. No sooner had Prince Shōtoku seen the beautiful objects which early Buddhist missionaries had brought over from Korea and China than he resolved that his people should make beautiful objects too. From the mainland he brought over teachers: architects and sculptors, bronze-molders and tile-makers, masons and weavers, painters and gilders, and, with his own people as pupils, set them to work on an amazingly ambitious dream. On the slopes of a lovely valley, with massive green mountains for background, he began to build one of the great temple-palaces of Asia; which he designed not only as a source of spiritual

munications were better; they had now for over two hundred years been slowly acquiring knowledge of the indispensable medium, the Chinese language; and China itself, after protracted strife and confusion, entered after the Sui dynasty (589-617) upon a period of brilliance and luxury, described by one historian as the time of "*la Chine joyeuse*"—the T'ang dynasty.

Inspired by his contacts with China and Buddhism, Shōtoku not only erected forty-six temples in different parts of Japan during the last five years of his life, but he became a distinguished sculptor. One may still see at Hōryūji what may be the tribute of his own hands to Buddhism; in a heroic figure of Kwannon, the god or goddess of mercy, unconventional, vital in every flowing line, the great benign face illumined with one of the most charming smiles that has ever been carved upon wood. A magnetic preacher, throngs filled his temples as he taught the law of culture based on religion, which is a fair description of Japanese Buddhism. The pioneer Japanese historian, he gave to his people their first national chronicle, now unhappily lost. As statesman and law-giver he excelled, providing the first written statutes, on which the later laws of the "Great

Change" were based. Shōtoku transformed Japan. Under his influence "the light of Asia" spread like a sunrise. The transformation under Shōtoku in the seventh century was every whit as spectacular as that second transformation which has astonished the world thirteen centuries later. Japanese historians do not over-rate him when they call him the Father of Civilization. "He left behind him peace where he had found strife and anarchy, the light of civilization in the place of the darkness of semi-barbarism, the knowledge and practice of art and science where there had been none before, reverential observance of a religion which was destined to mold the character of his countrymen for more than a thousand years." When, in 621, he died, still less than fifty years old, the ancient chronicles say that the farmer ceased from his plowing and the pounding-woman laid down her pestle; they all said, "The sun and moon have lost their brightness, heaven and earth have crumbled to ruin—henceforth in whom shall we trust?" Nobles and commoners alike, the old as if they had lost a dear child, the young as if they had lost a loved parent, filled the ways with the sound of their lamenting.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the words of Prince Shōtoku that have come down to us is their modernity. Although eager to learn from the past, he was much more concerned with the present, and supremely bent on the future. This comes out in his answers to his father, the Emperor Yōmei, when the latter still questioned confusedly among the conflicting claims of Shintō, Confucianism, and Buddhism. "There is really no conflict among them," said Shōtoku, in so many words; "Shintō is the rule of the dead. It deals with the past, and not with the present or future. Confucianism is concerned with the present, but is not in the least forward-looking. Only Buddhism teaches about the future; and, as all men are anxious about the future, it is inevitable that many should embrace Buddhism" — which his dying father decided to do.

In one of his most penetrating essays Matthew Arnold says that Thucydides is more modern than Sir Walter Raleigh, notwithstanding the vast chasm of time. He means that the later English writer is not only turgid, but fusty; he lacks the great antiseptic of style; whereas in Thucydides there is an immortal freshness, as though he

had written yesterday. We find this same freshness in some of the writing of Shaka the Buddha; or, rather, in his words as his disciples recorded them; especially when he writes of love as the greatest thing in the world, or of the three cardinal sins. In the writing of "the Constantine of Buddhism," as Shōtoku has sometimes been called, one finds always this touch of modernity. "To turn away from that which is private and to set one's face toward that which is public—that is the path of a minister." Where shall we look for a more pithy definition of statesmanship? Some of his precepts echo the Bible, of which he of course never heard: "Chastise that which is evil, encourage that which is good." "Good faith," he further observes, "is the foundation of right; in everything let there be good faith, for in it surely consists the good and the bad, success and failure." One of his sayings has even a timely note in these hours of clamor, and is to be recommended to those international statesmen whose raucous voices each insists on shouting the other man down, whose only gesture seems to be the ability to turn a deaf ear. To such speaks the voice of Shōtoku, calm and sane through the centuries:

Let us not be resentful when others differ from us. All men have hearts, and each heart has its own leanings. Their right is our wrong, and our right is their wrong. We are not unquestionably sages, nor are they unquestionably fools. Both of us are simply ordinary men.

JAPAN'S FUTURE

"What of Japan's future?"

ALTHOUGH but an ordinary man, the moment has come when the present writer must give his own modest answer to the question that has been asked of him often during the last three months, "What of Japan's future?" This question seems to be disturbing every thoughtful man and woman in the Empire. The country is not self-complacent, as some foreign critics suppose; the people are in a deeply troubled mood. They realize that their beloved Nippon is in the throes of a crisis, and I think there might perhaps be general agreement that the elements of that crisis are somewhat as given in Chapter I. Sometimes the sharp question is followed by one about the future of China.

The fact seems to be that the two nations must face the future together, whether they like it or not, whether for good or for evil. Not only their propinquity and their natural trade relations, but their older culture guarantees this. No other two

nations in all the world are so vitally tied together by bonds geographic and historical. When the late President Roosevelt said (as quoted in Chapter VI) that Japan's ethnic line of development was not identical with her cultural line he was using diplomatic language to remind her that she owes her culture to China, just as America owes hers to Europe. In the matter of language alone Japanese is far more deeply indebted to Chinese than English is to Latin and Greek together. As Brinkley and Kikuchi say in their history, Japanese in its original form had little capacity for expansion, whereas Chinese excels in this regard all known tongues.

Chinese may be said to consist of a vast number of monosyllables, each expressed by a different ideograph, each having a distinct significance, and each capable of combination and permutation with one or more of the others, by which combinations and permutations dissyllabic and trisyllabic words are obtained representing every conceivable shade of meaning. It is owing to this wonderful elasticity that Japan, when suddenly confronted by foreign arts and sciences, soon succeeded in building up for herself a vocabulary containing all the new terms, and containing them in self-explaining forms. . . . Hundreds of such words have been manufactured in Japan during the past half-century

to equip men for the study of Western learning, and the same process, though on a very much smaller scale, had been going on continuously for many centuries.

As we saw in the last chapter, with the coming of the language in early centuries came the vast and rich Chinese literature, to say nothing of law and art and everything that makes civilization, so that Japan is as culturally bound up with China as America is with England. These two Far Eastern nations cannot sunder the ties that bind them no matter how hard they try; although they can, if they are foolish enough to do so, continue to make each other supremely uncomfortable, like a pair of quarrelsome Siamese twins.

In their hearts the Japanese realize this, and sometimes they shyly inquire whether they can hope ever to win back the friendship of China. I always say that "ever" is a very long word, reaching backward as well as forward. Not only in the days of Shōtoku, but often since, the relations between the two countries have been intimate. They were friendly not many years ago. True, China just now is in an exasperating mood, and her combined communism and anarchy

make her a menace; but if we take the long historical view it is conceivable that Japan may win back the friendship of China. The importance to both nations of such restored friendship runs through the Lytton Report from the first page to the last. It is not over-emphasized. The future welfare of Japan depends first of all on improved relations with China.

It depends scarcely less on the friendship of the United States. Far away though America is, she is much nearer than in the days of Perry, nearness now being measured not by miles but by motor-ships, air-planes, and the wireless. Quite apart from geography, moreover, the two countries have economic relations that can no more be escaped than the relations between Japan and China, whether for good or for evil; so that it is hardly too much to say that the second most important factor in determining the future of Japan is across the Pacific Ocean.

Russia next comes to mind, but if Japan secures and maintains the friendship and confidence of China and the United States as well as of an independent and prosperous Manchuria, she can deal with Russia.

Other nations are of course important,

but not so supremely important as these. Great Britain's continuing friendship is almost a foregone conclusion. No better plan for working toward a trilateral goal has ever been suggested than that of Dr. Young as outlined in Chapter X.

Japan has her internal problems, but the heart of her people is so sound that all she really has to worry about is *survival*.


That is a strong statement, but as I see it Japan is either going down like a dead meteor in the event of a general war of which she would assuredly be deemed the instigator, or, breasting the present crisis and summoning all her reserves of wisdom and forbearance, she is likely to achieve a destiny worthy of the highest aspirations of *Nippon Seishin*.

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JAPAN-WHITHER ?

◆ 日本は何處へ？ ◆

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